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INTRODUCTION 
Our tale begins in 1847, “[a] long time ago in a galaxy” not so far 
away.
1
  Most African Americans in Maryland were held in bondage.  Wom-
en had neither the right to vote nor the right to own property.  The invention 
of the automobile would not occur for another fifty years and the Industrial 
Revolution had yet to transform the economy of Maryland.  Accordingly, 
the number of accidental injuries was extremely tiny when compared to 
their incidence today.
2
  Legal actions seeking compensation for negligently 
inflicted injuries were few and far between.  In that year, Maryland’s high-
est court, not its legislature, decided for the first time that contributory neg-
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ligence—the victim’s own careless conduct that contributes to his (a wom-
an could not then bring a legal action) injury—totally bars his recovery 
when the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct is also a cause of the injury, even if 
the tortfeasor’s wrongdoing is much more culpable than that of the victim.3 
Fast forward to July 9, 2013.  In Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Colum-
bia,
4
 six of the seven judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowl-
edged that they regard comparative fault—a doctrine that would apportion 
responsibility for plaintiff’s damages between the victim and the tortfeasor 
according to their respective degrees of fault—as both “‘more equitable’” 
and “‘more socially’” desirable than the continuance of the rule of contribu-
tory negligence.
5
  Everyone on the court agreed that it has the constitutional 
authority to change the common law and that the court ordinarily should 
overturn precedent when the overruling is justified by “‘changed condi-
tions.’”6  The court refused, however, to throw the doctrine of contributory 
negligence into the dustbin of history.
7
  Instead, it deferred to the Maryland 
General Assembly. 
Meanwhile, a short distance up the street, the General Assembly has 
been paralyzed by the standoff between two of Annapolis’s most powerful 
groups of lobbyists: on one hand, those representing business and insurance 
interests and, on the other hand, those representing plaintiffs’ trial counsel. 
Business lobbyists, in the face of substantial empirical evidence to the con-
trary,
8
 annually parrot the prediction that adoption of comparative fault 
would destroy Maryland’s economy and cost tens of thousands of jobs.9  
Representatives of Maryland’s business and insurance communities argue 
                                                          
 3.  See Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200, 204–05 (Md. 1847) (adopting, for the first time, contribu-
tory negligence as a total bar to recovery under Maryland law). 
 4.  432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013). 
 5.  The quoted phrases appear in the opinion of Judge Green, joined by three other judges, 
concurring in the decision.  Id. at 739, 69 A.3d at 1185 (Greene, J., concurring) (quoting Hoffman 
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973)).  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Harrell, joined by 
Chief Judge Bell, states that if the rule of contributory negligence “‘was ever viable, certainly it no 
longer comports to present day morality and concepts of fundamental fairness.’”  Id. at 709, 69 
A.3d at 1166–67 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (quoting Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 
1984)).  Judge Harrell further concludes that “[c]ontributory negligence is no longer justified, has 
been discarded by nearly every other jurisdiction, and is manifestly unjust.”  Id. at 715, 69 A.3d at 
1170.  
 6.  Id. at 689, 69 A.3d at 1155 (opinion of the court) (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)). 
 7.  See infra text accompanying notes 40–44. 
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 231–233. 
 9.  Brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the Maryland Tort Reform Coalition 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 20 , Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 
679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013) (No. 9), 2012 MD App. Ct. Briefs 49 [hereinafter Chamber of Com-
merce Brief] (citing non-peer-reviewed study prepared for Chamber of Commerce showing that 
pure comparative negligence would decrease job growth by two percent over four years).   
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that Maryland must retain the rule of contributory negligence because, in so 
many other regards, the tax and litigation climate in Maryland is more anti-
business than it is in other states.
10
  Further, these advocates claim that the 
neighboring states of Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia 
are most often the jurisdictions in competition with Maryland in attracting 
businesses.  These jurisdictions comprise three-quarters of the trivial num-
ber of jurisdictions that, like Maryland, continue to apply contributory neg-
ligence.
11
  These same lobbyists conveniently ignore the fact that Delaware, 
ranked by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as the nation’s most business-
friendly state, is also a comparative fault state.
12
 
At the same time, at least a few of the most politically potent plain-
tiffs’ lawyers in the state choose not to push comparative fault reform too 
aggressively because such a path would likely lead to a broader reform em-
phasizing “liability according to fault,” precisely the set of reforms we pro-
pose here.
13
  Plaintiffs’ attorneys who practice in areas such as asbestos liti-
gation fear reform of the current “all or nothing” rule of joint and several 
liability,
14
 and those who practice in areas where plaintiffs are unlikely to be 
at fault, such as medical malpractice, are, at best, ambivalent about compar-
ative fault if it is coupled with reform of joint and several liability. 
In this Article, we present the Maryland General Assembly with a 
comprehensive, balanced proposal for apportioning liability according to 
fault in Maryland tort cases.  We begin with a recommendation that Mary-
land adopt comparative fault.
15
  This is not a radical suggestion.  Forty-six 
                                                          
 10.  See, e.g., Richard P. Clinch & Matthew Kachura, Maryland Business Climate Survey 
2011, Annual Report, THE JACOB FRANCE INST. 1, http://www.jacob-france-institute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/BCS-2011-Annual.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (reporting that a plu-
rality of Maryland businesses surveyed indicated that the state’s business climate was “anti-
business” or “business unfriendly” and citing taxes as “the greatest disadvantage to doing business 
in the state”); State Lawsuit Climates: Maryland, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/maryland (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) 
(ranking Maryland thirty-third among fifty states in the fairness and reasonableness of its lawsuit 
climate in 2012).  The neighboring state of Delaware, a comparative negligence jurisdiction, 
ranked first in the fairness of its litigation environment, also in 2012.  State Lawsuit Climates: 
Delaware, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/delaware (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) [hereinafter 
Delaware, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE].  
 11.  Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that change to comparative neg-
ligence would “make Maryland less competitive with neighboring jurisdictions—Virginia, North 
Carolina, and the District of Columbia—all of which apply contributory negligence”).  
 12.  See Delaware, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 10.  
 13.  See infra notes 237–267, 360–364, 376–385 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc 
Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 203, 209 (2003) (de-
scribing importance of joint and several liability to plaintiffs’ lawyers in asbestos cases).  
 15.  See infra notes 237–302 and accompanying text.  
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of the fifty states have adopted comparative fault.
16
  We outline the ad-
vantages of both “pure” comparative fault and a variant, known as “modi-
fied” comparative fault, which denies any recovery to the victim (plaintiff) 
when the plaintiff is more at fault than the defendant.
17
  Obviously the 
change from contributory to comparative fault is one that many in the plain-
tiffs’ bar would applaud. 
We also argue, however, that the principle of “liability according to 
fault” that underlies comparative fault favors two changes in Maryland law 
that will benefit at least some Maryland businesses.  First, we recommend 
replacing the traditional doctrine of joint and several liability, which pro-
vides that a defendant, including a “deep pocket” defendant whose degree 
of fault is small, is held responsible for all the damages originally allocated 
to an often far more culpable co-defendant, who turns out to be judgment 
proof or immune from liability and is therefore unable to pay.
18
  We rec-
ommend that the co-defendant’s unpaid share be reallocated among the re-
maining parties based on their respective degrees of fault.
19
  Second, we be-
lieve that Maryland should do away with its statute that provides that 
evidence of seat belt nonuse is inadmissible;
20
 yet another example of 
Maryland’s current “all or nothing” approach to apportioning liability, be-
cause it does not allow a jury to consider the plaintiff’s unsafe conduct in 
failing to secure her or his seat belt when apportioning liability.  The pro-
posed legislation would be prospective, applying only to cases involving 
claims arising after the effective date specified by the General Assembly. 
In Part I, we analyze the decision of the Court of Appeals in Coleman 
and its invitation to the Maryland General Assembly to act.  Part II de-
scribes the advantages and disadvantages of a change from contributory 
negligence (as a total bar to recovery) to comparative fault.  In particular, 
we review the empirical literature addressing the effects of such a change 
on claims frequency, claims severity, liability insurance premiums, and the 
economic health of states making the change.
21
  We conclude that the Mary-
land business community’s rhetoric about the catastrophic effects of the en-
actment of comparative fault is exaggerated.
22
  In Part II, we also consider 
the relative merits of the two variants of comparative fault—pure compara-
                                                          
 16.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 712, 69 A.3d 1149, 1169 (2013) 
(Harrell, J., dissenting) (“Today, the number of states applying comparative negligence is forty-
six, and not one jurisdiction adopting it has since retreated and re-adopted contributory negli-
gence.”).  
 17.  See infra notes 237–302 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 311–324 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 360–364 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra notes 376–385 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See infra notes 184–187, 197–238 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra text accompanying note 184. 
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tive fault and modified comparative fault.
23
  In Part III, we consider issues 
related to the adoption of comparative fault, such as the ongoing status of 
the defense of assumption of risk and the doctrine of last clear chance.  Fi-
nally, in Part IV, we apply the same principle of apportioning liability ac-
cording to fault to both the reform of joint and several liability and the re-
peal of Maryland’s statute that precludes admission of evidence regarding a 
plaintiff’s nonuse of a seat belt.24 
I.  THE INVITATION TO ACT: COLEMAN V. SOCCER ASS’N OF COLUMBIA 
Our objective in this Article is to present a comprehensive, balanced 
approach that calls for Maryland courts to allocate damages resulting from 
negligence according to the respective degrees of fault of the parties, in-
cluding the plaintiff, the defendant, and any co-defendants, as well as to 
those who tortiously contributed to the harm but are not joined as parties.  
No one contends that the Maryland General Assembly lacks the authority to 
change the common law, assuming, of course, that the statutory modifica-
tion is constitutional.
25
  Further, the legislature, unlike the court, is able to 
address the role fault plays in apportioning damages among the parties in a 
comprehensive fashion.  Related issues arise in deciding to what extent the 
plaintiff’s fault should eliminate or reduce his right to recover (contributory 
negligence or comparative fault), allocating which portion of the judgment 
each joint tortfeasor owes to the plaintiff (joint and several liability or one 
of its alternatives), and determining how much one joint tortfeasor owes to 
another under any particular variant of contribution among tortfeasors. 
We strongly believe, however, that the Court of Appeals itself should 
have made the change to comparative fault.  First, we explain why we be-
lieve that the Court of Appeals erred in its reasoning in Coleman.
26
  We 
then highlight both the court’s invitation to the Maryland General Assembly 
to act and explain why we believe that the legislature should act in light of 
the court’s unwillingness to do so. 
                                                          
 23.  See infra notes 237–267 and accompanying text.  The authors respectfully disagree with 
one another about how this issue should be resolved.  Professor Robinette prefers pure compara-
tive fault; Professor Gifford prefers modified comparative fault.  
 24.  See also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22-412.3(h)(2) (West 2013). 
 25.  See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 689, 69 A.3d 1149, 1155 
(2013) (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 
903 (1983)) (acknowledging that “‘the General Assembly . . . is expressly empowered to revise 
the common law of Maryland by legislative enactment’”). 
 26.  See infra Part A. 
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A.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia: The Case 
When the Court of Appeals agreed to hear Coleman,
27
 many lawyers 
and judges believed the court would at long last leave the tiny group of ju-
risdictions that continue to hold that contributory negligence constitutes a 
total bar to recovery.
28
  Chief Judge Robert M. Bell was retiring, and it was 
well known that he favored the adoption of comparative fault.
29
  To many, 
the facts in Coleman were “plaintiff-friendly,” suggesting that the Court of 
Appeals had accepted certiorari in this particular case in order to add anoth-
er important accomplishment to Chief Judge Bell’s already impressive leg-
acy.
30
  A year later, we know better.  Chief Judge Bell was one of only two 
judges on the court to dissent to the outcome in Coleman.
31
  More im-
portant, despite the fact that a jury found that the Soccer Association of Co-
lumbia was negligent and that its negligence was a necessary, proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, James Kyle Coleman’s resort to the com-
mon law was unsuccessful.
32
 
During a soccer practice with a team of young players, Coleman, a 
volunteer assistant coach, kicked the ball into the goal.  As he retrieved the 
ball, he instinctively celebrated by jumping up and grabbing the crossbar of 
the goal.
33
  The goal was not anchored to the ground.  Coleman fell back-
wards, causing the crossbar to crash onto his face, resulting in “multiple se-
vere facial fractures which required surgery and the placing of three titani-
um plates in his face.”34 
                                                          
 27.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, cert. granted, 425 Md. 396, 41 A.3d 570 (2012) 
(No. 2011-568).  
 28.  William A. Goldberg, Maryland High Court Declines to Declare the ‘Dinosaur’ of Con-
tributory Negligence Extinct, LERCH, EARLY & BREWER (July 31, 2013), 
http://www.lerchearly.com/publications/857-maryland-high-court-declines-declare-dinosaur-
contributory-negligence (noting that the plaintiff was supported by numerous amici briefs in urg-
ing the Court of Appeals “to abolish the contributory negligence doctrine and replace it with a 
form of comparative negligence”). 
 29.  Ann E. Marimow, Maryland’s High Court Considers Rewriting Rules for Assessing 
Fault, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-
10/local/35495479_1_soccer-association-soccer-club-court-system.  
 30.  See Tony McConkey, Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions to Have Real Impact, 
DELEGATE TONY MCCONKEY’S OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.leg33.com/maryland-court-of-appeals/ (“Chief Bell has long been an opponent of the 
contributory negligence doctrine and his retirement figured prominently in speculation that the 
law was about to be overturned. . . .  [T]he acceptance by the Court [of Appeals] of a contributory 
negligence case was seen as Chief Bell’s attempt to put an end to the controversial 300+ year old 
law as his crowning achievement on his way out the door . . . .”). 
 31.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 695, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013) 
(Harrell, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Robert Bell joined Justice Harrell in his dissent.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 684–85, 69 A.3d at 1152 (opinion of the court). 
 33.  Id. at 683, 69 A.3d at 1151. 
 34.  Id.  
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Coleman sued the Soccer Association.  At trial, the coach, who had in-
vited Coleman to be an assistant coach, testified that he had not inspected 
the goal where the accident occurred to ensure that it was properly an-
chored.
35
  Other witnesses testified that it was common for those participat-
ing in soccer to hang from the crossbar of the goal.
36
  The jury found the 
Soccer Association negligent, but it also found that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent.
37
  The trial court judge quite properly applied Mary-
land law as it existed and denied Coleman any recovery.
38
  Before the case 
could be briefed and argued in the Court of Special Appeals (the intermedi-
ate appellate court), the Court of Appeals (the highest appellate court) ac-
cepted certiorari to consider the sole issue of whether contributory negli-
gence should continue to be a total bar to recovery.
39
 
The Court of Appeals held “we decline to abrogate Maryland’s long-
established common law principle of contributory negligence.”40  Judge El-
dridge’s opinion for the court relies heavily on the fact that “the General 
Assembly has continually considered and failed to pass bills that would 
abolish or modify the contributory negligence standard,” thus providing “a 
clear indication of legislative policy at the present time.”41  Judge Eldridge 
also recounts the various other reasons given by the court’s opinion three 
decades earlier in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education,
42
 in 
which the court refused to abrogate contributory negligence, including the 
principle of stare decisis
43
 and the complexities involved in the implemen-
tation of comparative fault and its effect on related areas of law such as 
joint and several liability.
44
 
Judge Greene wrote a concurring opinion joined by three other judges 
of the seven-member court, reiterating Judge Eldridge’s conclusion that it is 
up to the legislature to change the common law on the issue of contributory 
negligence.
45
  Perhaps Judge Greene wrote the opinion to express his per-
                                                          
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 684, 69 A.3d at 1152. 
 38.  Id. at 684–85, 69 A.3d at 1152. 
 39.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, cert. granted, 425 Md. 396, 41 A.3d 570 (2012) 
(No. 2011-568).  
 40.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 685, 69 A.3d at 1152. 
 41.  Id. at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157.  
 42.  295 Md. 442, 444, 456 A.2d 894, 902–03 (1983).  
 43.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 687–90, 69 A.3d at 1154–55; see also infra notes 76–95. 
 44.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 A.3d at 1154; see also infra notes 124–131 and 239–364 
(addressing issues of implementation and collateral consequences).  
 45.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 738–39, 69 A.3d at 1185 (Greene, J., concurring) (stating that “we 
should defer to the General Assembly . . . [to avoid] cast[ing] ourselves as a Court attempting to 
impose our will upon the General Assembly”). 
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sonal view that “[he] would prefer a system of comparative negligence,”46 
and the other three judges may have added their name to the concurrence 
for the same reason.
47
  In Part I.E, we examine the reasoning of the court’s 
opinion and the concurring opinion in greater detail. 
Judge Harrell, in his dissenting opinion, expressed his intense disdain 
for the doctrine of contributory negligence: 
 Paleontologists and geologists inform us that Earth’s Creta-
ceous period (including in what is present day Maryland) ended 
approximately 65 million years ago with an asteroid striking 
Earth (the Cretaceous-Paleogene Extinction Event), wiping-out, 
in a relatively short period of geologic time, most plant and ani-
mal species, including dinosaurs.  As to the last premise, they are 
wrong.  A dinosaur roams yet the landscape of Maryland (and 
Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina and the District of Columbia), 
feeding on the claims of persons injured by the negligence of an-
other, but who contributed proximately in some way to the occa-
sion of his or her injuries, however slight their culpability.  The 
name of that dinosaur is the doctrine of contributory negligence.  
With the force of a modern asteroid strike, this Court should ren-
der, in the present case, this dinosaur extinct.  It chooses not to do 
so.  Accordingly, I dissent.
48
 
Judge Harrell systematically dismantles the court’s purported justifica-
tions for failing to act.
49
  In large part, his reasoning mirrors our own analy-
sis presented in Part I.E. 
B.  The Basics of Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault 
Under Maryland’s doctrine of contributory negligence, even if the jury 
believes that the defendant’s negligence is far more culpable (or contributed 
far more to the injury) than the victim’s own contributory negligence, that 
is, the plaintiff’s failure to use reasonable care to protect herself or himself, 
the plaintiff still recovers nothing.
50
  The alternative to contributory negli-
gence as a total bar to recovery is known as comparative fault or, some-
times, comparative negligence or comparative responsibility. 
There are two basic forms of comparative fault: “pure” and “modi-
fied.”  Under the pure form of comparative fault, the jury is asked to com-
pare the defendant’s negligence that was a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 739, 69 A.3d at 1185.  
 47.  Id. at 740, 69 A.3d at 1186.  
 48.  Id. at 695–96, 69 A.3d at 1158 (Harrell, J., dissenting).  
 49.  Id. at 703–24, 69 A.3d at 1163–76. 
 50.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 696, 69 A.3d at 1159. 
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with the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence, and to quantify the com-
parison by attributing a percentage of fault to each party.
51
  The plaintiff’s 
recovery is then determined by multiplying the total amount of her or his 
damages by the defendant’s percentage of fault.  For example, if the jury 
finds that the plaintiff is ten percent at fault and the defendant is ninety per-
cent at fault, the plaintiff receives ninety percent of the total damages.  In 
contrast, the outcome for the plaintiff under a contributory negligence rule 
would be to recover nothing. 
Most courts adopting comparative fault endorse the variant known as 
pure comparative fault that operates as described above.
52
  More often than 
not, however, it is the legislature that adopts comparative fault, and all or 
virtually all legislatures adopting comparative fault have opted for the  
“modified” version.53  Under modified comparative fault, a plaintiff who is 
more at fault than the defendant (most modified comparative fault jurisdic-
tions), or equally at fault as the defendant (a small minority of such jurisdic-
tions), recovers nothing.
54
  Otherwise, as in a pure comparative fault state, 
the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to 
the plaintiff. 
Perhaps the most basic question under any comparative fault regime is 
exactly what it is that the court is asking the jury to compare.  Is the appor-
tionment to be made by comparing the respective levels of culpability of 
plaintiff and defendant?  Or, by comparing the extent to which each party’s 
fault contributed to the plaintiff’s injury?  Many statutes55 and some judicial 
opinions
56
 suggest that the jury should consider only the plaintiff’s and de-
fendants’ respective degrees of fault.  Other judicial opinions hold that 
courts should only consider the respective contribution of the parties to the 
harm (causation).
57
  The growing trend, however, is for juries to consider 
                                                          
 51.  Id. at 699 n.4, 69 A.3d at 1161 n.4; see also id. at 724–25, 69 A.3d at 1176 (quoting 4 
FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON 
TORTS § 22.15 (3d ed. 2006)). 
 52.  When the legislature either initially adopts comparative negligence or steps in after the 
court initially adopts comparative negligence, it usually enacts a system of modified comparative 
negligence.  See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 64, 81 (5th ed. 2010).  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 699 n.4, 724, 69 A.3d 1149, 1161 
n.4, 1176 (2013) (Harrell, J., dissenting); HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 51, §22.15. 
 55.  See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 51, § 22.16 (comparing the negligence 
statutes in states such as Wisconsin, Mississippi, Maine, Oregon, and Delaware).  
 56.  See, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he re-
quired comparison is between the respective costs to the plaintiff and to the defendant of avoiding 
the injury.”); State v. Kaatz, 572 P.2d 775, 782 (Alaska 1977) (“What is to be compared is negli-
gence—conduct, fault, culpability—not causation, either physical or legal.”). 
 57.  See, e.g., Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1459 (6th Cir. 1993) (not-
ing that for purposes of comparative contribution in a maritime personal injury action, “we adopt a 
comparative causation approach to apportioning damages between tortfeasors”); Moffitt v. Car-
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both factors.  For example, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment 
of Liability provides that in assigning percentages of liability to the plaintiff 
and to each defendant, the fact finder should consider both “the nature of 
the person’s risk-creating conduct” and “the strength of the causal connec-
tion between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm.”58 
C.  The Coleman Court’s Own Preference for Comparative Fault 
The opinion of the court and the concurring opinions in Coleman are 
curious in any number of regards.  Nowhere do they present any substantive 
argument that the continued application of contributory negligence yields 
more just, fair, or efficient judicial decisions than would a change to com-
parative fault.  Judge Eldridge’s opinion makes absolutely no attempt to re-
but the substantive arguments that he explicitly acknowledges exist in favor 
of abrogating contributory negligence: 
They argue contributory negligence is an antiquated doctrine, that 
it has been roundly criticized by academic legal scholars, and that 
it has been rejected in a majority of our sister states.  It is also 
pointed out that contributory negligence works an inherent un-
fairness by barring plaintiffs from any recovery, even when it is 
proven, in a particular case, that a defendant’s negligence was 
primarily responsible for the act or omission which resulted in a 
plaintiff’s injuries.  It is said that contributory negligence pro-
vides harsh justice to those who may have acted negligently, in 
minor ways, to contribute to their injuries, and that it absolves 
those defendants from liability who can find any minor negli-
gence in the plaintiffs’ behavior.59 
Even more blatantly, Judge Greene, concurring in an opinion joined by 
three of his colleagues (thus constituting a majority of the seven-member 
court), wrote, “I am willing to concede that a system premised on compara-
tive negligence for apportioning fault appears to be a more equitable system 
                                                          
roll, 640 A.2d 169, 175 (Del. 1994) (interpreting Delaware’s comparative negligence statute to 
apportion liability “on the basis of the extent of each actor’s contribution to the injurious result, 
i.e. proximate causation”). 
 58.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000).  According to 
the co-reporter for this restatement, the “causal relation referred to in this provision refers to how 
closely the harm that occurs falls within the risk created by the party’s negligence,” that is, scope 
of liability, rather than to any aspect of cause in fact.  Telephone interview with Michael D. Green, 
Co-reporter, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability (Oct. 10, 2013).  Similarly, 
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that “[i]n determining the percentages of fault, the 
trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the 
causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.”  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 
§ 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 135 (1977).  
 59.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 691, 69 A.3d 1149, 1156 (2013). 
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of determining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss distri-
bution.”60  These four concurring judges, combined with the two dissenting 
judges,
61
 constituted a super-majority of the court that found that compara-
tive fault is “more equitable” and “more socially desirable” than contributo-
ry negligence. 
Further, the court explicitly accepted the idea that the original purpose 
of the creation of contributory negligence during the first half of the nine-
teenth century in Maryland and elsewhere was to protect emerging indus-
tries and a new form of transportation, railroads, from juries that “had the 
potential to stifle newly developing industry”62 and “wreak financial disas-
ter upon that burgeoning” railroad industry.63  Obviously, these justifica-
tions no longer apply in the twenty-first century. 
D.  Judicial Authority to Overturn Contributory Negligence 
The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that it “has the authority to 
change the common law rule of contributory negligence.”64  Judge Greene’s 
concurring opinion echoes this reality: “[T]here is no dispute about whether 
this Court has the authority to change the common law.”65  In the same 
vein, Judge Eldridge, writing for the court, noted that stare decisis should 
not be construed to inhibit the court “from changing or modifying a com-
mon law rule by judicial decision [when] . . . the rule has become unsound 
in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable 
to our people.”66  The court’s opinion continues: “This Court has repeatedly 
said that the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism—
its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just 
and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.”67  Further, the court 
acknowledged that “because contributory negligence is a court-created 
principle, and has not been embodied in Maryland statutes, this Court pos-
sesses the authority to change the principle.”68 
Then the court punted, abdicating its judicial duty in the process.  To 
recap the reasoning of the judges, the court’s opinion implicitly suggests 
that it recognizes that contributory negligence is an unfair, antiquated policy 
                                                          
 60.  Id. at 738, 69 A.3d at 1185 (Greene, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 61.  Id. at 696, 69 A.3d at 1184–85 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (calling contributory negligence an 
“‘all-or-nothing’” doctrine of judicial “‘Big Bang’” origin (citing Butterfield v. Forrester, [1809] 
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.))).  Chief Justice Bell joined in this opinion.  Id. at 738, 69 A.3d at 1184.  
 62.  Id. at 686, 69 A.3d at 1153 (opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63.  Id. at n.5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64.  Id. at 684, 69 A.3d at 1152.  
 65.  Id. at 738, 69 A.3d at 1184 (Greene, J., concurring). 
 66.  Id. at 689, 69 A.3d at 1155 (opinion of the court) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 67.  Id. at 692, 69 A.3d at 1156 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68.  Id. at 691, 69 A.3d at 1156.  
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with its roots and justifications lying in a long-past era that no longer ap-
plies. The concurring opinion openly states that the rule is neither “equita-
ble” nor “socially desirable.”69  The judges recognized that it is within their 
authority as common law judges to adopt comparative fault.
70
  The court, 
however, ultimately decided to apply the law of contributory negligence in 
Coleman and to future cases.
71
 
E.  Evaluating the Court’s Own Justifications for Deferring to the 
Legislature 
In and of itself, the widespread judicial and legislative adoption of 
comparative fault suggests a discordant anomaly.  How is it that Maryland, 
usually perceived to be one of the nation’s most progressive states,72 is one 
of only four states that retains a doctrine regarded as traditional, conserva-
tive, anti-consumer, and even antiquated? 
Why then did the court fail to overturn the common law doctrine of 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery and replace it with com-
parative fault?  In the following sections, we examine the validity of each of 
the justifications offered by the court.  Ultimately, the opinion for the court 
relied heavily on the proposition that “[t]he General Assembly’s repeated 
failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of contributory negligence 
is very strong evidence that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain 
the principle of contributory negligence.”73  As we explain in Section 2 of 
this Part, legislative inaction in failing to overturn common law decisions of 
the Court of Appeals cannot appropriately be construed as legislative ap-
proval of the status quo—a proposition that the Court of Appeals itself has 
repeatedly recognized.
74
 
1.  Stare Decisis 
The basic law of torts—governing, among other things, whether or not 
the victim of a personal injury is able to recover from the party who caused 
the injury—is determined by judge-made or common law, except when the 
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 739, 69 A.3d at 1185 (Greene, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 70.  Id. at 692, 69 A.3d at 1156–57 (opinion of the court) (noting various cases in which the 
Court of Appeals has had “the ability to modify common law”). 
 71.  Id. at 691–95, 69 A.3d at 1156–58. 
 72.  Editorial, Blue Maryland Gets More Liberal, BALT. SUN, Dec. 27, 2013, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-12-27/news/bs-ed-year-in-review-20131219_1_maryland-
politics-voters-governor-o-malley (“Maryland has long been a heavily Democratic state, but 2013 
may have cemented its status as a truly liberal one.”).  
 73.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 694, 69 A.3d at 1158.   
 74.  See infra Part I.E.2. 
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legislature acts affirmatively.
75
  Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, in their clas-
sic text, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application 
of Law, which presents a traditional and conservative perspective on the ap-
propriate boundaries between the legislative and judicial functions, state: 
The body of decisional law announced by the courts . . . tends al-
ways to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of 
law governing the society.  Legislatures and administrative agen-
cies tend always to make law by way not of original solution of 
social problems, but by alteration of the solutions first laid down 
by the courts.
76
 
In this regard, American law differs from that of most other countries, 
such as China, France, or Russia, where the law governing personal injury 
claims is statutory, enacted by the legislature, albeit often in very broadly-
articulated terms.
77
 
The legitimacy of the common law differs from that which gives au-
thority to statutes enacted by legislatures and regulations and rulings of ad-
ministrative agencies.  Judicial rulings are not meant to be a reflection of 
the will of the electorate.
78
  Instead, the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking 
rests on the idea that judges begin their reasoning process with a presump-
tion that they will follow precedents in earlier cases on similar facts.
79
  Even 
in the 1890s, however, at a time when the law of negligence dominated the 
legal landscape, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., later a Supreme Court Justice 
and regarded as perhaps the key figure in defining the traditional law of 
negligence, wrote the following: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more re-
volting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished 
                                                          
 75.  See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000) (“Tort law is predominantly common 
law. That is, judges rather than legislatures usually define what counts as a tort and how compen-
sation is to be measured.”). 
 76.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994).   
 77.  See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 24–25 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that “the accepted theory of sources of law in the civil 
law tradition recognizes only statutes, regulations, and custom as sources of law,” hence a judge 
“cannot turn to . . . prior judicial decisions for the law”).   
 78.  See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 
692 (1980). 
 79.  See United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1965) (“The genius of the 
common law lies in the process of reasoned elaboration from past precedent . . . .”); Jill E. Fisch, 
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1107 
(1997) (explaining that the requirement that common law courts’ decisions be tied to precedents 
or “explicit text . . . provides legitimacy to judge-made rules”).  
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long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past.
80
 
Few American judges, lawyers, and legal scholars in the late-twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries subscribe to the views of legal formalism or “me-
chanical jurisprudence” that often prevailed during the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries, when the common law was sometimes conceived 
of as nothing more than rules deduced from precedents applied syllogisti-
cally to the facts of the present case.
81
  For example, as early as 1936, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone stated, “[T]he law itself is something 
better than its bad precedents . . . the bad precedent must on occasion yield 
to the better reason.”82  He specifically suggested that courts are justified in 
overruling precedents because “[s]cience, invention and industrial expan-
sion have done more than all else to change the habits of life of the peo-
ple . . . since the Civil War . . . than occurred in the three centuries which 
followed the discovery of America.”83  Judge Learned Hand, a conservative 
and one of the most respected judges of the mid-twentieth century, similarly 
concluded that while the judge “must preserve his authority by cloaking 
himself in the majesty of an overshadowing past . . . he must discover some 
composition with the dominant trends of his time.”84  Even Sir Edward 
Coke, perhaps the most important writer on the topic of the common law as 
it developed in England, wrote as early as the sixteenth century that prece-
dents should be overruled when the results of such precedents lead to “in-
convenience.”85 
The common law evolves as societal norms and relevant aspects of so-
ciety change, such as, in the case of negligence law, the types and sources 
of tortious harms.  Precedents establish the starting point of the common 
law process, but only the starting point.  The Court of Appeals has repeated-
ly acknowledged this through the decades as it altered the precedents that 
previously governed recovery (or more typically, prevented recovery) for 
tortious injury.
86
  In the past, the court explicitly stated, “Because of the in-
                                                          
 80.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
 81.  WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION 32 (1994) (characterizing formalism).  
 82.  Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1936).  
 83.  Id. at 11.  
 84.  Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1939).  
 85.  ROSCOE POUND, THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW 125 (1937) (noting Coke had de-
clared “inconvenience in the results of a rule established by precedent is strong argument to prove 
that the precedent itself is contrary to the law”). 
 86.  Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 334, 390 A.2d 77, 77 (1978) (abolishing the defense of 
interspousal immunity in the case of outrageous intentional torts); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
278 Md. 337, 350, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (adopting strict liability as expressed in § 402A of 
the Restatement (2d) of Torts); Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 56, 57 A.2d 318, 
321 (1948) (relaxing the privity requirement in third-party beneficiary cases). 
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herent dynamism of the common law, we have consistently held that it is 
subject to judicial modification in the light of modern circumstances or in-
creased knowledge.”87  The court also explicitly has cited “the guidance of a 
significant majority of other states”88 as a justification for overturning prec-
edents. 
Along with the authority of the Court of Appeals to establish the 
common law, and to change it when circumstances warrant modification, 
comes judicial obligation.  When a litigant presents a court with a claim of 
right, the court is obligated to rule on the claim assuming that the court has 
jurisdiction over it.
89
  In this regard, the court is fundamentally different 
from a legislature, which establishes new law only when it wants to do so 
and can always decide not to address an issue.  A court cannot decide that 
an issue is too difficult or too controversial upon which to rule.  It must de-
cide the litigant’s claim.  Even if the court wrote, as it did in Coleman, that 
it is up to the legislature to make any change in the law, in doing so the 
court reaffirmed that the law status quo ante governed both the case before 
it and others in the future.  A common law court cannot pass the buck.  In-
deed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly stated that “it is our 
duty to determine the common law as it exists in this State.”90 
The role of the court in establishing the law in a field such as torts, 
where the common law predominates, is very different from the role of the 
court in evaluating a claim that a statute or executive action is unconstitu-
tional.  In the latter instance, the proper role of the court is to defer to the 
legislature unless there is no rational justification for the statutory enact-
ment or executive action, except where the claim involves either a suspect 
class or a fundamental right.
91
  In short, in cases raising constitutional chal-
lenges, the legislature or the executive has the primary responsibility for de-
claring what the law is and the court acts only in highly unusual circum-
stances.  When it comes to the common law, however, the courts have the 
                                                          
 87.  Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987).  
 88.  B&K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 158, 596 A.2d 
640, 645 (1991).  
 89.  HART & SACKS, supra note 76, at 373 (implicitly arguing that it is “a postulate of a free 
society that a tribunal” is obligated to find grounds to decide the case before it); see also Fred C. 
Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 714–15 (1986) (arguing that while 
“[l]awmakers and regulators . . . often ignore conditions requiring redress . . . [j]udges presented 
with actual controversies, in contrast, have a duty to decide”).   
 90.  E.g., Ass’n of Indep. Taxi Operators v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204, 82 A.2d 106, 
117 (1951) (emphasis added).  
 91.  See, e.g., DRD Pool Serv. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 67, 5 A.3d 45, 57 (2010) (explaining that 
“[t]he rational basis test is highly deferential” and “presumes a statute is constitutional and should 
be struck down only if the reviewing court concludes that the Legislature enacted the statute irra-
tionally or interferes with a fundamental right”).   
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responsibility—indeed, the obligation and the duty—to establish the law 
unless and until the legislature acts. 
Judge Eldridge’s opinion in Coleman recognizes that “changed condi-
tions” justify a court in overturning a precedent, thereby changing the 
common law.
92
  This acknowledgement echoes the words of Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who once wrote: “[I]f the mores of their day are 
no longer those of ours, [judges] ought not to tie, in helpless submission, 
the hands of their successors.”93 
Since Maryland first adopted contributory negligence in 1847,
94
 the 
universe of accidental injuries in Maryland has changed beyond recogni-
tion.  These “changed conditions” easily surpass the threshold that the 
Court of Appeals itself established for overturning a precedent and should 
compel the Maryland General Assembly to act in the face of the court’s ju-
dicial abdication.  We discuss these changes in the next Part.
95
 
2.  Legislative Inaction 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the legislature could change 
the common law of contributory negligence if it were inclined to do so.
96
  
The Maryland legislature, however, has never codified the judge-made law 
of contributory negligence.
97
  The petitioners in Coleman were not asking 
the court to declare unconstitutional a statute establishing contributory neg-
ligence as a total bar to recovery, but rather asking the court to fulfill its re-
sponsibility to declare the common law, taking into account changed condi-
tions.
98
  As such, there simply is no legislative policy or public policy 
declared by the legislature in the state of Maryland to which the court has 
any reason to defer. 
                                                          
 92.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 689, 69 A.3d 1149, 1155 (2013).   
 93.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 152 (1921); see also, 
e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 403 (1975) (overruling common law 
precedent because “subsequent history and experience have conspicuously eroded the rule’s foun-
dations”). 
 94.  Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200, 204–05 (Md. 1847).  
 95.  See infra Part II.A.2.  
 96.  See supra text accompanying note 25. 
 97.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 702, 69 A.3d at 1162 (“In the absence of codification by the Legis-
lature, the defense of contributory negligence remains a dependent of the common law, and as 
such, is within the province of its parent, this Court, to abrogate or modify that to which it gave 
birth and nurtured.”). 
 98.  Id. at 691, 69 A.3d at 1156 (opinion of the court) (“Petitioner correctly contends that, 
because contributory negligence is a court-created principle, and has not been embodied in Mary-
land statutes, this Court possesses the authority to change the principle.”). 
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In recent years, the Maryland General Assembly has considered legis-
lative proposals to adopt comparative fault on a number of occasions.
99
  
There, proposals have failed to receive an affirmative recommendation from 
either or both of the judiciary committees of the two houses of the legisla-
ture.
100
  The Coleman court erroneously concluded that the legislature’s 
failure to impose comparative fault thus establishes that contributory negli-
gence reflects the “legislative policy” or the “public policy” of the state.101  
The legislature’s failure to act, however, does not necessarily indicate its 
opposition to a proposed piece of legislation.
102
  Leading constitutional law 
scholar Laurence Tribe further explains: 
When the array of powers held by the executive, the judiciary, or 
the states with respect to a given matter can be transformed only 
by congressional approval or disapproval, then it is essential that 
such approval or disapproval take the form of legislation made 
through [the formal constitutional procedures for passing laws.
103
 
The issue posed in Coleman, of course, could have been resolved by 
the court instead of by the legislature, so reading legislative inaction as bar-
ring the court from changing the existing common law was even more in-
appropriate.  In Goldstein v. State,
104
 the Court of Appeals itself took the 
same approach: 
Maryland generally adheres to the majority view on legislative 
inaction, which is that ordinarily the fact that a bill on a specific 
subject fails of passage in the General Assembly is a rather weak 
reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent.  Thus, 
the mere fact that the General Assembly has declined to adopt a 
                                                          
 99.  See id. at 693 n.6, 69 A.3d at 1157 n.6 (listing several unfavorable House and Committee 
reports on legislative proposals to adopt comparative negligence legislation).   
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at 694–95, 69 A.3d at 1158 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 102.  See HART & SACKS, supra note 76, at 1358–60 (identifying twelve reasons, other than 
opposition to the merits of the proposal, why “legislators may have either for opposing a bill or 
simply withholding the votes necessary for its forward progress” and indicating the existence of 
additional reasons); see also, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of 
Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 322 (2005) (arguing, in part, that “‘congressional acquies-
cence’—the belief that congressional inaction . . . reflects congressional acquiescence . . . is mis-
guided”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69–70, 
90–94 (1988) (pointing out inconsistencies in interpretations of legislative inaction in Supreme 
Court cases and positing that such inaction, as a demonstration of “the actual collective will or 
desire of the enacting legislature . . . should rarely be given much, or any, weight”); Lawrence C. 
Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 177, 186–94 (1989) (criticizing the theory of deliberate legislative inaction on sev-
eral grounds, including congressional ignorance of judge-made law, failure of bills to pass or be 
introduced, interpretational ambiguity, and irrelevance). 
 103.  1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205 (3d ed. 2000). 
 104.  339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995). 
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particular proposal does not preclude this Court from incorporat-
ing the substance of that proposal into the common law . . . 
 Courts have traditionally been reluctant to infer legislative in-
tent from legislative inaction when there are several possible rea-
sons for defeat.
105
 
In Coleman, the court made no attempt to distinguish Goldstein. 
It is far easier to kill a legislative proposal than it is to enact it.  From 
the founding of our Republic,
106
 Congress and state legislatures have oper-
ated with “veto gates” or “negative legislative checkpoints”107 designed to 
protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
108
  As Professor and As-
sociate Dean Maxwell Stearns of the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law observes, “[t]he very mechanisms designed to protect 
against majority tyranny by making legislation more difficult to procure 
serve as venues for special interest influence.”109 
Enacting comparative fault legislation requires the Maryland General 
Assembly to undertake a difficult process that usually requires action by 
two houses of the legislature, the signature of the governor, and the time 
and energy required to accomplish these steps during an often crowded and 
busy legislative session.  Adding to the legislature’s challenge is the fact 
that sometimes (even in Maryland at points during the past 170 years), the 
governor and the majority in each legislative chamber are not of the same 
political party.  Stearns observes that “[t]hese junctures make it easier to 
block than to pass legislation because success at every focal point is re-
quired for passage whereas failing at only one is sufficient for defeat.”110  
Legislative inaction is not a declaration that the legislature approves the ex-
isting common law.
111
 
During the mid-1990s, one of us (Gifford) attended committee hear-
ings of the Maryland General Assembly considering replacing contributory 
negligence with comparative fault.  Legislators who voted against such re-
form legislation often explained their votes by saying “this is a matter for 
the courts to decide.” 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 569–70, 664 A.2d at 378 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 106.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 125 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“To 
secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time 
to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our 
inquiries are directed.”). 
 107.  Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 311, 316 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 108.  Id. at 315–16. 
 109.  Id. at 316. 
 110.  Id. at 336. 
 111.  See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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Further, if the court is deriving the legislative policy or public policy 
of the state from the General Assembly’s failure to enact proposed legisla-
tion adopting comparative fault, what significance should be given to the 
fact that the legislature also has repeatedly failed to codify the doctrine of 
contributory negligence?
112
  The court’s failure to even mention this legisla-
tive inaction is totally at odds with its conclusion that legislative inaction 
establishes the public policy of the state.
113
  The court cannot have it both 
ways. 
Finally, what is the precedential value of the holding in Coleman?  If 
the court’s opinion means that it will not change the common law when the 
legislature repeatedly has failed to do so, the implications are staggering.  
Each legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly considers many 
bills designed to change one specific aspect or another of the judge-made 
common law of Maryland.  Often such tort reform proposals are recycled 
year after year.  If the Court of Appeals were to apply Coleman as prece-
dent, it would refuse to consider the merits of litigants’ arguments whenev-
er the legislature has repeatedly refused to change the law.  Obviously, if 
that occurs, the common law of torts in Maryland is no longer on life sup-
port.  It is truly dead. 
What is worse is that Coleman results in a perverse incentive for spe-
cial interest lobbyists to encourage members of the General Assembly to 
introduce legislation opposed to the interests of the lobbyists’ clients under 
circumstances in which passage of the legislation is highly unlikely, in or-
der to establish a record that the legislature has repeatedly failed to overturn 
the common law status quo ante.  If Coleman is to be treated as a precedent, 
a legislative record finessed by special interest lobbyists would bar the 
Court of Appeals from changing the common law. 
3.  The Prevalence of Legislative Adoption of Comparative Fault 
The court’s opinion in Coleman repeatedly points out that most other 
states adopted comparative fault through legislation.
114
  Most of these 
states, however, had done so by 1983.
115
  When the Court of Appeals last 
considered a possible change from contributory negligence to comparative 
fault, in most jurisdictions comparative fault was still a recent develop-
                                                          
 112.  See, e.g., H.B. 1156, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
 113.  See supra text accompanying note 101. 
 114.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 689, 69 A.3d 1149, 1154 (2013).  
The court fails to acknowledge that in at least some states, the legislative enactments were in fact 
legislative modifications of earlier judicial decisions adopting comparative fault.  E.g., IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 668.1 et seq. (West 2013), superseding Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W. 2d 742, 
744 (Iowa 1982).  
 115.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 688, 69 A.3d at 1154 (reporting “that, as of 1983, of the thirty-nine 
states that had adopted comparative negligence, thirty-one had done so by statute”).  
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ment.
116
  Now it is three decades later.  For the reasons stated earlier, the 
Maryland General Assembly has not enacted comparative fault.
117
  The 
court read this legislative inactivity as “a clear indication of legislative poli-
cy” in favor of “the contributory negligence doctrine.”118  To us, it appears 
more likely that the legislature would prefer not to make a politically 
charged decision. 
During the past generation, the Court of Appeals and the General As-
sembly have given one another an extremely wide berth when it comes to 
matters of tort law.  Maryland avoided the often intense inter-branch turf 
battles between state legislatures and state supreme courts that many other 
states experienced during battles over tort reform.  A number of other state 
legislatures passed “tort reform” statutes changing the common law, only to 
have state supreme courts declare such legislation unconstitutional.
119
  In 
extreme cases, these turf wars degenerated into public name-calling.
120
  In 
contrast, in Maryland, the Court of Appeals never pushed the common law 
too hard or too fast in a plaintiff-oriented direction.  In turn, the General 
Assembly enacted tort reform statutes less frequently than other state legis-
latures and deferred to the Court of Appeals on tort law.  Finally, the Court 
of Appeals rarely declared tort reform statutes to be unconstitutional. 
In apparently following this same approach in refusing to discard con-
tributory negligence, however, the Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of 
judicial deference and passed the threshold of judicial abdication.  Again, 
the court was not being asked to declare a statute enacting contributory neg-
ligence to be unconstitutional.
121
  Rather, the court was developing the 
common law of torts, a task committed in the first instance to the court, not 
the legislature.
122
  On the merits of the social desirability and equity of the 
proposed change, six of the seven members of the court found comparative 
                                                          
 116.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 1.01 (reporting that only seven states had adopted compara-
tive negligence before 1960 and only six more by 1970).  
 117.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 690, 69 A.3d at 1155.   
 118.  Id. at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157.   
 119.  E.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1071–72, 
1111 (Ohio 1999) (holding unconstitutional an Ohio tort reform initiative and describing a decade-
long “power struggle . . . waged by powerful and capable interests on both sides of the issue, 
[which] has created turbulence among our coordinate branches of government”).  
 120.  See, e.g., Editorial, Ohio Supreme Court: Tort Retorts: A Petty, Insulting Ruling, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 22, 1999, at D2 (calling the ruling “an insult to the General Assem-
bly”); Editorial, Role Reversal: High Court Again Tries Hand at Lawmaking, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Aug. 18, 1999, at 10A (calling the court “a legislative bulldozer, upending whatever 
law conflicts with the ideological bent of the majority, legal and constitutional principles be 
damned”). 
 121.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 691, 69 A.3d at 1156. 
 122.  See supra Part I. 
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fault to be the preferred approach.
123
  As common law judges, it was their 
duty to honor their own convictions. 
4. Concerns About Details of Implementation and Collateral 
Consequences 
Both the court’s opinion and Judge Greene’s concurring opinion also 
express concerns about the details of the implementation and the collateral 
consequences of the adoption of comparative fault—such as whether to 
adopt pure or modified comparative fault; how it would apply in the case of 
multiple tortfeasors; and whether its adoption would affect the ancillary is-
sues of joint and several liability, contribution, assumption of risk, and last 
clear chance.
124
  Ironically, however, as Judge Harrell pointed out, most 
states adopting comparative fault legislatively have not done so through the 
enactment of comprehensive legislation.
125
  Instead, most legislatures “have 
enacted short-form statutes that leave most doctrinal issues to be shaped and 
developed by the courts.”126 
Somehow other state supreme courts, while identifying the same is-
sues, have concluded that the courts are able to work out such issues as the 
years go by.
127
  A generation after adopting the principle of comparative 
fault, the judicial systems of these states have operated smoothly, without 
descending into chaos or confusion.
128
  Perhaps the members of the court 
are not aware that these specific issues are among those typically addressed 
today in first semester Torts classes.  Of course, the legislature may want to 
get involved in the specifics of implementation if it thinks the courts are 
getting things wrong, but this does not excuse the court from walking away 
from the important transcendent issue of whether or not contributory negli-
gence should be replaced with comparative fault.  Indeed, Professor Fred C. 
                                                          
 123.  See supra Part I.C. 
 124.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 687–88, 69 A.3d at 1154; see also id. at 738–40, 69 A.3d at 1185–
86 (Greene, J., concurring).  
 125.  Id. at 722–23, 69 A.3d at 1175 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1241 (Cal. 1975) (stating that these is-
sues have “not diminished our conviction that the time for a revision of the means for dealing with 
contributory fault in this state is long past due and that it lies within the province of this court to 
initiate the needed change by our decision in this case”); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439–
40 (Fla. 1973) (“We feel the trial judges of this State are capable of applying this comparative 
negligence rule without our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected problems.”).  
 128.  See, e.g., Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 85 (Cal. 1997) (“Using Li [v. Yel-
low Cab Co.] as our guidepost, we proceeded . . . to determine which category of assumption of 
risk cases should be merged into the comparative fault system and which category should not.”); 
Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1982) (“In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 
1973), we established the rule of comparative negligence in this state and held that liability should 
be equitably apportioned on the basis of fault.”). 
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Zacharias argues that a court performs an important political function when 
it prompts such a legislative response: 
A new rule temporarily imposes liability upon a politically well-
represented group.  In response, the group is expected to activate 
legislative or administrative attention to the social problem under-
lying the cases in which the rule applies.  In the long run, the leg-
islature or executive agency will provide a solution and make the 
determination of who should bear the accident costs, and how. 
 . . . . 
 Such litigation thus signals a continuing, widespread need for 
relief.  It highlights an underlying social condition that may ulti-
mately require legislative, rather than judicial, solutions.  But the 
signal reaches only judges.  Imposing liability upon politically 
well-represented groups in turn is judges’ sole effective means to 
forward the message for legislative consideration.
129
 
Further, an opposite outcome in Coleman would not have required the 
court to address the issues about which Judge Greene is concerned—issues 
not presented by the case—at this time.  As the Florida Supreme Court stat-
ed when it adopted comparative fault forty years ago in Hoffman v. 
Jones,
130
 “[I]t is not the proper function of this Court to decide unripe is-
sues, without the benefit of adequate briefing, not involving an actual con-
troversy, and unrelated to a specific factual situation.”131  When such issues 
would be posed to the Court of Appeals, the court would be able to draw 
upon decades of experience from the courts and legislatures in forty-five 
other states.  The wheel would not need to be reinvented.  At the same time, 
we acknowledge the institutional advantages of having the legislature com-
prehensively address how liability should be apportioned according to fault 
across a range of intertwined issues.  It is to that task that we turn to in the 
remainder of this Article. 
In summary, we disagree strongly with the unwillingness of the Court 
of Appeals to overturn contributory negligence as a complete bar to recov-
ery and replace it with comparative fault.  The court’s decision is not well 
grounded and rests almost entirely on the past unwillingness of the Mary-
land General Assembly to enact comparative fault reform.
132
  Given the 
outcome in Coleman and the advantages of a comprehensive approach, 
however, we now join the court in urging the legislature to act in a way that 
                                                          
 129.  Zacharias, supra note 89, at 725–26.  
 130.  280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
 131.  Id. at 439.  
 132.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 693–95, 69 A.3d 1149, 1157–58 
(2013). 
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produces a framework for allocating damages arising from tortious harms 
that is both more equitable and more socially desirable. 
II.  CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE VERSUS COMPARATIVE FAULT ON THE 
MERITS 
A.  Positive Arguments for Comparative Fault 
At one time, every American jurisdiction followed the rule of con-
tributory negligence, by which the plaintiff is barred from recovery if her 
negligence contributed, in even a slight manner, to her injuries.
133
  As late 
as the mid-1960s, only seven states had adopted some form of the alterna-
tive rule of comparative fault.
134
  Over the next two decades, the landscape 
changed dramatically; by 1985, forty-four states had switched from con-
tributory negligence to comparative fault.
135
  Currently forty-six states op-
erate under a comparative negligence rule, leaving contributory negligence 
the rule in only Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
136
  What reasons support such an overwhelming move-
ment away from contributory negligence? 
1.  Fairness 
The very basic problem with contributory negligence is that it does not 
properly apportion responsibility for injuries.  A negligence regime makes 
fault the basis for apportioning responsibility for unintentional injuries.
137
  
Yet, other options are available.  Fault could be irrelevant to responsibility 
for unintentional injuries.  A jurisdiction could adopt a system of no liabil-
ity, in which a loss remains where it falls even if caused by fault.  Alterna-
tively, a jurisdiction could create a rule of strict liability, by which an injur-
er would be held responsible even in the absence of fault.
138
  In certain 
limited contexts, jurisdictions have selected these options by the use of no 
                                                          
 133.  Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which is the 
Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 41 (2003).   
 134.  Id. at 42–43. 
 135.  Id. at 43. 
 136.  Id. at 44–45 n.27.  South Carolina adopted comparative negligence in 1991, see Nelson v. 
Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991), and Tennessee did so in 1992, see McIn-
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 137.  This is at least true formally.  See Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge for Civil 
Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 543, 543 (2013) (arguing that the importance of fault in automobile 
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 138.  For a brief history of the role of fault in tort law, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE 
FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 48–53 (3d ed. 2007). 
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duty rules or immunities on one hand,
139
 or by adopting strict liability that 
does not require fault, such as liability for manufacturing defects in prod-
ucts liability cases, on the other hand.  In general, however, jurisdictions 
have opted for a liability regime based on negligence; people are responsi-
ble for injuries they cause if they are at fault.  In Maryland, as in other 
American jurisdictions, negligence is the default rule for treatment of unin-
tentional injuries. 
Contributory negligence is inconsistent with apportioning responsibil-
ity based on fault.  Any fault on plaintiff’s part erases all responsibility for 
fault by defendants.  As an example, consider a person driving through an 
intersection who briefly glances down to adjust her radio.  At the same 
time, another driver, drunk, runs a red light and injures the first driver.  The 
vast majority of fault in this case belongs to the driver who ran through a 
stop light, yet the slight amount of fault by the injured driver is sufficient to 
prevent recovery under a contributory negligence rule.  The injured driver is 
forced to bear the entire loss resulting from the negligence of both parties.  
She must pay all economic losses and she must accept noneconomic losses 
in the form of pain and suffering.  The driver who ran the red light is re-
lieved of all responsibility despite overwhelming fault in causing the inju-
ries. 
Such improper allocation is most troubling in extreme cases, but is al-
so problematic in cases where fault is more evenly balanced.  Assume in-
stead of glancing at the radio, the driver made a turn into the intersection 
without looking, where she is hit by the driver running a red light.  Now the 
injured driver’s fault is greater, perhaps in the thirty percent to forty percent 
range.  The imbalance is not as great, but why should the driver who ran a 
red light be absolved of responsibility for her fault?  The injured driver is 
going to pay for her share of fault in the form of the injury suffered.  Under 
a negligence rule, the driver who ran the red light should be responsible for 
her share of fault as well. 
In an article in the late 1970s, the late Professor Gary Schwartz also 
concluded that contributory negligence is inconsistent with a negligence re-
gime: 
 If this idea of fairness thus calls on tort law to take some ac-
count of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence in ascertaining the 
liability of a negligent defendant, the question arises of what ap-
propriate form the legal doctrine should assume.  As presented, 
the fairness idea is entirely satisfied by a liability-dividing rule 
like comparative negligence. . . . There is nothing in [the] logic 
                                                          
 139.  See, e.g., Tinsley v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 429 Md. 217, 55 A.3d 663 
(2012) (governmental immunity); Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 447, 805 A.2d 
372 (2002) (no duty).  
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[of the contributory negligence idea] that would be impaired or 
compromised were it deployed in support of a liability-reducing 
rule rather than a liability-denying rule.  Moreover, as we have 
seen, the rule of negligence liability itself has a satisfactory moral 
basis, one that is based on our disapproval of antisocial or egotis-
tical conduct.  To negate altogether a plaintiff’s lawsuit against a 
negligent defendant would be to allow the fairness idea associated 
with the contributory negligence defense to extinguish the moral 
idea that predicates negligence liability.
140
 
For contributory negligence to be legitimate, there would have to be 
some reason why an injurer’s fault is so much less significant than an in-
jured victim’s fault that any amount of victim’s fault eliminates the im-
portance of an injurer’s fault.  No serious argument to this effect has been 
offered.  In fact, arguably sometimes an injurer’s fault is more blameworthy 
than an injured victim’s fault.  In other words, not only does the contributo-
ry negligence rule ignore the amount of fault between the injurer and the 
injured, it can also ignore the quality of such fault.  An injurer’s careless-
ness toward other people is arguably more blameworthy than an injured vic-
tim’s carelessness in risking her own safety.  Carelessness toward others is 
the antisocial or egotistical conduct of which Professor Schwartz spoke.  A 
person is risking harm to other people by her conduct; she is prioritizing her 
convenience over the safety of others.
141
  By contrast, carelessness for one’s 
own safety is not egotistical or antisocial; the consequences of carelessness 
toward oneself will be felt personally and not externalized.
142
  Of course, 
some conduct that is carelessness for one’s own safety is also carelessness 
toward others.
143
  In those instances, even if the quality of the fault is not 
different, the amount of fault between injurer and injured is still ignored. 
To place the issue in the parlance of tort theory, contributory negli-
gence is inconsistent with corrective justice.
144
  The essence of corrective 
justice is that a party who wrongfully injures another must correct the 
wrong to restore the moral balance between the parties.
145
  Injurers cannot 
literally correct the wrong by healing the injury; liability is therefore im-
posed as a substitute for the previous bodily health and autonomy.
146
  Under 
contributory negligence, an injurer can be relieved of the burden of correct-
                                                          
 140.  Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE 
L.J. 697, 725 (1978).   
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id. at 722–23. 
 143.  Id. at 723. 
 144.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 47–50. 
 145.  ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 15. 
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ing her moral wrong.
147
  If the injured victim is at all responsible for caus-
ing her own injury, the injurer bears no responsibility to correct her 
wrong.
148
  This can leave a moral imbalance in place, in violation of correc-
tive justice.
149
  The greater the moral imbalance left in place by the paucity 
of the victim’s fault, the more troubling is contributory negligence. 
We also predict that the adoption of comparative fault will increase 
consistency in the handling of plaintiffs’ cases among Maryland counties, 
as well as among juries in any particular county.  More than fifty years ago 
when contributory negligence reigned, Lewis Powell—later an Associate 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court—opined that independent American ju-
ries already applied a form of comparative fault in practice.
150
  In many cas-
es where the juries believe that plaintiffs were contributorily negligent, they 
nevertheless find in the plaintiffs’ favor but reduce the verdicts to account 
for the plaintiffs’ fault.151  Even more important, given that well over ninety 
percent of all negligence cases settle,
152
 is the reality that defendants and 
their insurance carriers typically make settlement offers even when they be-
lieve that plaintiffs are contributorily negligent, but discount the settlement 
offers by their estimates of the probability that the jury will find contributo-
ry negligence and therefore render a verdict for the defendant.  Assuming 
that many juries ignore the strict rule of law that a plaintiff who is contribu-
torily negligent should recover nothing,
153
 the application of the doctrine is 
likely to be widely inconsistent.  For example, Maryland attorneys infor-
mally report that jury verdicts in Baltimore City are often more pro-plaintiff 
than those in adjoining counties such as Harford or Howard Counties.
154
  It 
is very likely that at least some juries in Baltimore City are more likely im-
plicitly to nullify the rule of contributory negligence than those in Howard 
or Harford County.  Would a Baltimore jury have found Coleman’s actions 
to have been contributorily negligent?  The doctrine of contributory negli-
gence as a total bar to recovery, considered harsh and unfair by many ju-
                                                          
 147.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 48. 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Contributory negligence is not necessarily inconsistent with civil recourse theory, an al-
ternative theory of tort as individualized justice.  According to civil recourse theory’s authors, 
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ries,
155
 undermines the rule of equal justice under law as well as respect for 
the rule of law. 
2.  Changed Conditions 
Conditions have changed dramatically since jurisdictions across the 
United States adopted contributory negligence, and Maryland provides an 
excellent example.  The Court of Appeals, in Irwin v. Sprigg,
156
 adopted 
contributory negligence in 1847, a doctrine the court has ritualistically reaf-
firmed as precedent since that time.
157
 
The most relevant changes since 1847 are those that relate to acci-
dental injury.  In 1850, the population of Maryland was 583,034.
158
  Even 
though the first railroads were built in the preceding decades, the industrial 
revolution had yet to transform Maryland; it remained largely an agrarian, 
tobacco-growing state.
159
  In short, Maryland had yet to experience what le-
gal historian John Fabian Witt described as “the great waves of industriali-
zation in the American economy [that] have always been . . . a central inter-
pretive tool in explaining changes in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
law of torts.”160  Obviously, the automobile—the largest single source of 
negligence cases in modern-day Maryland, once described by federal circuit 
court of appeals Judge Guido Calabresi as an evil deity who demanded 
55,000 lives every year in exchange for providing amazing powers of indi-
vidual transportation
161—would not be invented for another half-century.162  
Although statistics indicating the numbers of accidental injuries and deaths 
caused by negligence in Maryland in 1847 are not available, it is notewor-
thy that in 1870 only thirteen personal injury claims were filed in New York 
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City, a number that would increase more than thirty-fold within forty 
years.
163
 
Today, a high percentage of damages resulting from negligence ac-
tions are paid for by liability insurance.  In the 1840s, except for maritime 
insurance, there was no liability insurance
164—any judgment against de-
fendants would be paid from their own pockets. 
In modern times, Maryland courts, as well as those of other jurisdic-
tions, recognize both loss minimization (deterrence) and loss distribution 
(compensation) as legitimate goals of tort law.
165
  Notwithstanding (or if 
you prefer, legitimizing) the objections of the Tea Party, both loss minimi-
zation and loss distribution at the hands of the other branches of govern-
ment dramatically increased during the twentieth century in ways unimagi-
nable in 1847.  Regulation of goods and services by federal agencies such 
as the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection 
Agency, as well as by state agencies, are integral components of the Ameri-
can economic structure.
166
  We spread losses of old age and misfortune 
through governmental programs such as social security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid, as well as through private health insurance.  The pervasiveness of  
both government regulation and insurance programs—and, to a greater or 
lesser extent, the public’s acceptance of these roles of government—
presents a very different world from that of 1847. 
3.  Compensation 
As noted, Maryland courts accept compensation or loss distribution as 
a goal of tort law.  Comparative fault provides compensation to injured vic-
tims more effectively than contributory negligence.
167
  Comparative fault 
allows injured victims to recover compensation for injuries in many cases 
where contributory negligence would deny it.  By contrast, there is no case 
in which contributory negligence would allow compensation to an injured 
victim but comparative fault would deny it.  Therefore, in terms of loss-
spreading, comparative fault is unquestionably the preferable doctrine. 
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B.  Counterarguments and Responses 
There are strong arguments that, when combined with its status as a 
miniscule minority rule, leave the proponent of contributory negligence 
with a heavy burden of proof.  The fairness argument is particularly power-
ful.  As Professor Kenneth Abraham states, “in my view the appeal of com-
parative negligence to the ordinary individual’s sense of fairness is suffi-
ciently great to render this factor alone virtually dispositive on the issue.”168  
In the face of these arguments, proponents of contributory negligence raise 
two common counterarguments against comparative fault: (1) it will un-
dermine personal responsibility, and (2) it will cause adverse economic ef-
fects. 
1.  Personal Responsibility 
In one sense, the argument based on personal responsibility has it 
backwards.  After all, it is contributory, not comparative, negligence that 
allows a person to escape responsibility for her actions.  As long as an in-
jured victim can be proved the slightest bit responsible for her own injury, 
an injurer’s responsibility, even if it is overwhelming, is negated.  Moreo-
ver, injured victims are not allowed to evade responsibility under a compar-
ative fault regime.  The injured victim must accept responsibility for her 
own portion of fault in the form of the injury suffered.  If the injured victim 
is thirty percent responsible for her injury, she must accept that amount of 
the economic and noneconomic damages from the injury. 
Proponents of contributory negligence also ascribe an alternative 
meaning to the argument from personal responsibility.  They argue that if 
comparative fault is enacted, accidents will increase because potential vic-
tims will be less careful for their own safety.  This claim is a familiar one, 
but it does not appear to be supported by evidence.  When scholars discuss 
the “efficiency” of contributory negligence and comparative fault, they are 
referring to both inducing care and minimizing costs,
169
 which can make it 
difficult to discuss the two elements in isolation.  The theoretical literature 
on efficiency, however, has gone through four phases: (1) contributory neg-
ligence is more efficient; (2) under perfect information, the rules are equiva-
lent; (3) comparative fault is more efficient; and (4) skepticism about a 
global decision regarding which rule is preferred.
170
  Thus, the current gist 
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of the theoretical literature on the issues of accident prevention and costs is 
that neither rule offers a global advantage. 
When the focus is narrowed to accident prevention, the results appear 
the same.  The debate essentially follows the phases for overall efficien-
cy.
171
  The theoretical debate tends to be just that; very rarely is empirical 
data used to support either contributory or comparative fault.
172
  The occa-
sional use of empirical data tested a previously constructed theoretical mod-
el of incentives instead of actual behavior.
173
  Yet, as Professor Gary 
Schwartz stated, “[W]hat does it mean to say that legal rules ‘create incen-
tives’ for efficient conduct if there is no evidence that they in fact bring that 
conduct about?”174 
To determine the effects of contributory negligence versus compara-
tive fault, if any, on actual behavior, one of the authors of this article (Robi-
nette) and a statistician co-author analyzed automobile accident data com-
piled by the Insurance Research Council.
175
  Bodily injury and property 
damage claims were analyzed as indicators of the behavior of the jurisdic-
tions’ populations.176  Analyzing the most recent data available (from 
1998), the authors determined that there was no statistically significant dif-
ference in bodily injury or property damage claims behavior between con-
tributory negligence and comparative fault jurisdictions.
177
  Because the 
sample size for the contributory negligence jurisdictions was so small in 
1998, the authors also analyzed data from 1980.
178
  The 1980 data expanded 
                                                          
 171.  See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 51–54. 
 172.  See, e.g., TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 169, at 74 (“There is very little empir-
ical analysis of the performance of these rules with respect to real-world behavior.”). 
 173.  See Michelle J. White, An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negli-
gence Rules in Accident Law, 20 RAND J. ECON. 308, 328 (1989) (concluding that contributory 
negligence offers superior incentives for care than does comparative negligence). 
 174.  Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 379 n.9 (1994) (quoting WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 312 (1987)). 
 175.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 54 n.61.  The data came from TRENDS IN AUTO 
INJURY CLAIMS (2000), published by the Insurance Research Council.  Automobile accidents 
were used because, unlike other categories of torts, data indicative of such accidents were availa-
ble.  Id.  Moreover, automobile accidents are the largest category of torts.  Id.; see also Thomas H. 
Cohen, Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL. 
(U.S. Dep’t of Just., D.C.), Nov. 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2132 (discussing tort cases concluded by a bench 
or jury trial in national sample of jurisdictions in 2005).  In addition, “unlike some significant cat-
egories of torts such as medical malpractice, the issue of contributory versus comparative negli-
gence is widely relevant” to automobile accidents.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 54 
n.61. 
 176.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 55. 
 177.  Id. at 59. 
 178.  Id. 
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the sample size of contributory negligence jurisdictions to fourteen.
179
  De-
spite the more robust sample, there was still no statistically significant dif-
ference in either bodily injury or property damage claims behavior between 
contributory negligence and comparative fault jurisdictions.
180
 
Perhaps there is no difference in accident claims because the weaker 
incentives for care placed on potential injured victims in comparative fault 
jurisdictions are offset by greater incentives for care on potential injurers.
181
  
Perhaps it is the case that the rule has no effect because the average person 
does not know about it and it does not affect her behavior.  Regardless, 
there is no convincing evidence that either contributory negligence or com-
parative fault is superior from the perspective of safety. 
Outside of the automobile context, there is even less likelihood that 
switching to comparative fault would decrease safety.  In other types of tort 
cases, businesses are more likely to be defendants.  The level of precaution 
adopted by a business is more likely to be a conscious and deliberate choice 
than is the conduct of individual plaintiffs found to be contributorily negli-
gent. 
2.  Adverse Economic Effects 
The preferred argument by proponents of contributory negligence is 
that moving to comparative fault will have significant adverse effects on 
Maryland’s economy.  More claims will be filed (because plaintiffs’ law-
yers will accept clients who are at fault) and trials will be more costly (be-
cause more time will be spent on apportioning fault).  More claims will be 
paid (because some plaintiffs are no longer barred from recovery).  The 
combined effect of these factors will lead to an increase in liability insur-
ance premiums.  The increase in premiums, plus the increase in payments 
by companies that self-insure, will lead to substantial economic contraction 
(fewer jobs) in Maryland. 
We expect more claims to be filed and more claims to be paid under a 
comparative fault regime.  In fact, an increase in injured victims recovering 
due compensation is the goal of switching to comparative fault.  We also 
acknowledge the possibility that liability insurance premiums may rise un-
der comparative fault.  Proponents of contributory negligence, however, 
have failed to meet their burden of proof not only that there will be liability 
insurance premium increases, but that such increases will be substantial.  
                                                          
 179.  Id. at 56. 
 180.  Id. at 59. 
 181.  See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 176.  In the automobile accident context, be-
cause, ex ante, a driver could be either an injured victim or injurer, the change in incentives would 
be changes that affected each driver personally instead of shifting incentives from one person to 
another. 
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Moreover, proponents of contributory negligence have failed to meet their 
burden of proof that the Maryland economy will suffer from a switch to 
comparative fault. 
Proponents of contributory negligence have assumed a difficult task in 
proving such matters.  Recall that the current state of the theoretical litera-
ture on the efficiency of contributory negligence versus comparative fault is 
that “skepticism prevails about deciding which rule is preferred.”182  Ac-
cording to a recent article on comparative fault, the economic efficiency 
merits of the two rules “have been wrestled with for decades, with no con-
clusive result.”183  In 2004, the Department of Legislative Services prepared 
a report for the Maryland General Assembly, to which one of the authors of 
this article (Gifford) contributed, that concluded “it is impossible to state 
with any certainty the direct and indirect consequences of changing to a 
comparative negligence system.”184  This becomes clear when considering 
the factors affecting each of the parts of the argument advanced by propo-
nents of contributory negligence.
185
 
a.  Administrative Costs 
Part of the argument that comparative fault will create adverse eco-
nomic effects is that claims frequency will increase and, as a result, cases 
will take longer to process; in short, that the costs of administering the tort 
system will increase.
186
  We acknowledge that more claims will be filed.  
We do not foresee, however, a flood of additional claims such that the tort 
system will be difficult to administer.  Juries already selectively apply com-
parative fault under the table,
187
 and plaintiffs’ lawyers are aware of it.  The 
                                                          
 182.  TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 169, at 46; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 169–170. 
 183.  Eli K. Best & John J. Donohue III, Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative Negli-
gence Regimes, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 945, 974 n.92 (2012). 
 184.  DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS: 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, COMPARATIVE FAULT, AND JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 23 
(2013) [hereinafter DLS, NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS]. 
 185.  See infra Parts II.B.2.a–d. 
 186.  See Jef De Mot, Comparative Versus Contributory Negligence: A Comparison of the Lit-
igation Expenditures, 33 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 54, 55 (2012) (identifying a study that found that 
comparative negligence “generate[d] higher litigation and administrative costs than the traditional 
negligence rules because the courts must decide on the degree of negligence by both parties and 
not just whether the parties were negligent”). 
 187.  See, e.g., H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 124–133 (2d ed. 1980) (recognizing that states with formal 
contributory negligence schemes may, for all practical purposes, be ones of comparative negli-
gence); Daniel Kessler, Fault, Settlement, and Negligence Law, 26 RAND J. ECON. 296, 297, 309 
(1995) (supporting the proposition with empirical data); Cornelius J. Peck, Comparative Negli-
gence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REV. 689, 726–28 (1960) (“[D]espite the 
legal bar of contributory negligence, comparative negligence is in fact practiced in all states, by 
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RAND Corporation, using Maryland-specific data, forecast that tort claims 
filed in Maryland would increase by only approximately six percent in the 
event of a switch to comparative fault.
188
  In comparison, factors other than 
changes in substantive rules, such as the degree of urbanization or popula-
tion density and the unemployment rate, have a far greater impact.
189
 
It is unlikely that the resources spent by defense counsel and plaintiff’s 
counsel to attribute most of the fault to the other party would be any greater 
than those currently expended as the parties fight over whether the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent.  There is a reduced incentive for defendants to 
prove plaintiffs at fault in a comparative fault system, so the increase in re-
sources expended to determine the percentage of fault may be offset by re-
duced resources devoted to proving plaintiffs’ fault.190  One factor that 
might affect the length of trials is the ability of plaintiff fault to truncate the 
case by the judge ruling as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could 
find for the plaintiff.  It is not only juries that are responsible for applying 
comparative fault under the table—judges have done so as well.  As a lead-
ing casebook notes: “Surely the most modern technique for ameliorating the 
perceived harshness of . . . contributory negligence . . . was the increased 
frequency with which courts found that reasonable persons could differ over 
the characterization of the plaintiff’s conduct—so that a jury question was 
presented.”191 
The administrative costs issue was studied in the aftermath of Arkan-
sas’s switch to comparative fault.  The study was conducted to determine 
whether there were any “discernible changes in local courts’ workload; 
what the changes were; and whether they helped or hindered the courts in 
disposing of personal injury cases.”192  The study concluded that “[t]he new 
rule . . . did not appreciably affect the length of trials; [but it] increased po-
tential litigation; promoted before-trial settlements; and made damages 
harder to determine.  But the net tendency was not to tip the balance mark-
edly in either direction.”193  Thus, “forecasts of putative effects upon 
                                                          
insurance adjusters, defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys, juries, and even judges.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 188.  ROLPH ET AL., supra note 162, at 28. 
 189.  Han-Duck Lee, Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, How Does Joint and Several Tort 
Reform Affect the Rate of Tort Filings?  Evidence from the State Courts, 61 J. RISK & INS. 295, 
308–09 (1994).  This study, incidentally, was paid for by the pro-defendant tort reform group, the 
American Tort Reform Association.  Id. at 301. 
 190.  Mot, supra note 186.  Moreover, resources devoted to applying exceptions to contributo-
ry negligence, such as last clear chance, will no longer be necessary.   
 191.  MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND 
ALTERNATIVES 437 (9th ed. 2011). 
 192.  Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A “Before and After” Survey, 
13 ARK. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1959). 
 193.  Id. at 108. 
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clogged dockets and delayed trials are not constructive arguments for either 
side.  Legislatures facing the issue should confine themselves to the sub-
stantive pros or cons of the contending principles and should rule out argu-
ments tied to problems of court administration.”194  Citing this “careful 
study,” Victor Schwartz, the leading commentator on comparative fault and, 
on most issues, the nation’s leading proponent of tort reform, states that the 
contention that comparative fault would create a greater flood of litigation 
or discourage settlement has been refuted.
195
 
b.  Liability Payments 
A second part of the argument is that there will be a substantial in-
crease in liability payments under comparative fault.  We again 
acknowledge the possibility of modest increases in aggregate loss payments 
after a switch to comparative fault, probably more if the switch is to pure 
comparative fault than if it is to modified comparative fault.  As with the 
administrative costs issue, and for one of the same reasons, the best availa-
ble evidence suggests that the increase in aggregate paid losses would not 
be substantial.  Once again, the starting point is that juries already apply 
comparative fault under the table.
196
  Many of the cases that would receive 
payment pursuant to comparative fault are already receiving payment de-
spite the formal bar of contributory negligence.
197
  Thus, the increase in the 
amount of new payments will not be as great as some expect. 
Moreover, the adoption of comparative fault may actually decrease 
payments in some cases.  Juries applying comparative fault under the table 
do not formally reduce the amount of a plaintiff’s recovery based on her 
percentage of negligence.  Although some juries may informally reduce the 
award based on a plaintiff’s negligence, there is evidence that others do not.  
An Illinois defense lawyer made a study of approximately four thousand 
cases in the two years before and after Illinois switched to comparative fault 
and found that the total amount of money awarded only slightly increased, 
indicating that plaintiffs who prevailed obtained somewhat lower recover-
ies.
198
  The same RAND study that predicted an increase in claims by six 
percent in Maryland if the state adopted comparative fault also found that 
negligent plaintiffs already recovering would average an offsetting twenty 
                                                          
 194.  Id. 
 195.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, at 478. 
 196.  See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 197.  This does not mean, however, that switching to comparative negligence is pointless.  In 
many ways, it is all the more cruel when juries unpredictably apply the formal law and prevent an 
injured victim from recovering.  We have both personally experienced instances in which juries 
applied contributory negligence despite their misgivings about its injustice. 
 198.  James G. McConnell, Damages About the Same Under Comparative Negligence, 
CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 18, 1986. 
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percent decrease in the amount recovered.
199
  A different RAND study not-
ed that a decline in median tort awards in 1980s Cook County, Illinois, was 
perhaps attributable to the advent of comparative fault; more plaintiffs were 
winning awards, but the awards were somewhat smaller because of a reduc-
tion for plaintiffs’ negligence.200  In the same vein, those plaintiffs who re-
covered pursuant to the last clear chance exception
201
 received all of their 
damages despite their fault in causing their injuries.  Under comparative 
fault, those payments would be reduced to account for the injured victim’s 
percentage of fault. 
Finally, it is also possible that any increase in payments caused by the 
switch to comparative fault will be offset by further changes in joint and 
several liability and the seat-belt defense that we recommend in Part IV of 
this Article. 
c.  Insurance Premiums 
The potential increase in insurance premiums is the adverse economic 
effects argument that receives the most emphasis.  We acknowledge the 
possibility that insurance premiums may rise if comparative fault is adopt-
ed, but it is unlikely that any increases would be substantial.  The author of 
the earliest study on the issue, a “painstaking survey,”202 concluded that the 
effects on insurance premiums of switching to comparative fault were “not 
observable.”203 
Other studies find minimal effects on insurance rates from switching to 
comparative fault.  In 1981, the North Carolina Legislative Research Com-
mission prepared a study for the General Assembly, which was considering 
legislation on the issue
204
: 
[T]he Committee sent a questionnaire to the State Insurance 
Commissioners of the 35 states that had by statute or court deci-
sion adopted comparative negligence. . . . 
                                                          
 199.  ROLPH ET. AL., supra note 162, at 28. 
 200.  DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE 
STATISTICS 14–15 (RAND Inst. for Civil Just. 1987). 
 201.  In a contributory negligence jurisdiction, the doctrine of last clear chance allows the 
plaintiff to recover, despite her contributory negligence in some circumstances, when the defend-
ant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury and negligently failed to take advantage of that 
chance.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479–480 (1965); see also infra notes 299–
300. 
 202.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 22.01[e] (referring to Professor Cornelius Peck’s survey). 
 203.  Peck, supra, note 187, at 709. 
 204.  Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in 
North Carolina, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1996) (citing N.C. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 
COMM’N, LAWS OF EVIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1981)). 
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 Twenty-four states responded. . . . Only one state, Alaska, indi-
cated a significant increase—estimated at 5%—in insurance pre-
miums resulting from the adoption of comparative negligence.  
Two states, Minnesota and Rhode Island, stated that no increase 
had resulted.  Fifteen states responded that the actual increase in 
premiums as a result of comparative negligence could not be de-
termined.  The Commissioner or his representative in ten of these 
states—Mississippi, Utah, Idaho, South Dakota, Maine, Oregon, 
Wyoming, Colorado, Wisconsin, and Montana—was of the opin-
ion that comparative negligence had no impact on insurance 
costs.  In five of these states—Hawaii, California, North Dakota, 
Nevada, and Oklahoma—it was felt that a slight increase in in-
surance premiums had resulted.  Six states—Georgia, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, and Vermont—indicated that 
they had no data upon which to base an estimate or opinion.
205
 
The Commission concluded that it could not “find any strong evidence 
to support the contention that insurance rates would increase substantially 
as the result of adoption of a comparative negligence [fault] system in 
North Carolina.”206 
Victor Schwartz opined that the effect on insurance premiums of 
switching from contributory to comparative fault has been “minimal.”207  
Citing the North Carolina study,
208
 the initial “painstaking survey” on insur-
ance premiums,
209
 and the study on administrative costs,
210
 Schwartz stated 
that contentions that insurance rates would hit “extraordinary heights” had 
been “refute[d].”211  He noted that this was because “insurance adjusters, 
juries, and sometimes even courts” are already practicing comparative fault 
under the table.
212
  Moreover, exceptions to contributory negligence, such 
as last clear chance, force defendants to pay the entire judgment, whereas 
comparative fault will reduce the amount of some payments.
213
 
Against this evidence, proponents of contributory negligence frequent-
ly cite three studies that purport to show substantial increases to insurance 
premiums caused by switching to comparative fault.  Professor Joseph 
Johnson completed studies for the North Carolina General Assembly in the 
                                                          
 205.  N.C. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, LAWS OF EVIDENCE AND COMPARATIVE 
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 206.  Id. at 18. 
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1980s as it was considering whether to adopt comparative fault,
214
 and he 
compared insurance premiums in Delaware and Maryland after Delaware 
switched to comparative fault.
215
  Professor Johnson also prepared a later 
study with Professors Daniel Winkler and George Flanigan.
216
 
The first two studies by Professor Johnson have been roundly criti-
cized.  These studies were provided to state legislatures instead of published 
in law reviews or peer review journals.
217
  The Maryland Court of Appeals 
Rules Committee issued a Standing Committee Report in 2011 finding that 
“[m]ost of the studies have been roundly criticized for being academically 
sloppy or incomplete.”218  A later version of the North Carolina study was 
critiqued in an article by Steven Gardner.
219
  He stated the study suffered 
from three methodological flaws.  First, the study compares premium data 
between states.  The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”) warns this can be “misleading” because automobile insurance “is 
not homogenous across states.”220  As a result, NAIC explained that a 
state’s “‘average premium will be relatively higher if policyholders in that 
state tend to purchase higher limits [of coverage] or insure more expensive 
cars.’”221  The second flaw is that “even if premium data could be compared 
between states, the [study] ignore[s] many variables that [could] contribute 
to premium costs.”222  NAIC lists a number of variables that impact premi-
ums, seventeen at the time Gardner wrote.
223
  The third, related, flaw is that 
                                                          
 214.  DLS, NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS, supra note 184, at 24 (citing Joseph E. Johnson & Associ-
ates, Inc., An Investigation of the Relative Costs of Comparative v. Contributory Negligence 
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 220.  Id. at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS FOR PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN 1993 6 (1995)). 
 222.  Id. at 51. 
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the study’s methodology attributes any difference between the average 
premium rates of contributory and comparative fault states to the single var-
iable of the type of negligence system the state uses.
224
  To demonstrate the 
weakness of the methodology, Gardner noted that New York’s insurance 
premiums were twice North Carolina’s when both states used a contributory 
negligence rule.
225
  Obviously, the vast difference in premiums was due to 
factors beyond the choice of negligence regime.  Gardner’s criticisms apply 
to the Delaware/Maryland study as well, as noted by the Department of 
Legislative Services in its 2004 report.
226
 
In a third study, Professor Johnson and his co-authors purport to con-
trol for population density, fatality rate per registered vehicle (which they 
claim is a proxy for the effects of road conditions, driver education pro-
grams, drunk driver enforcement, and other safety-related aspects), and the 
presence of no-fault automobile insurance.
227
  Nevertheless, the NAIC cau-
tions regarding the use of cross-state comparisons
228
 apply here as well.  
While accounting for a handful of variables among states, this third study 
ignores others, such as ones related to the level of insurance regulation, the 
competitiveness of the state’s automobile insurance market, and income.  
Consider just one of these examples.  Consumers in states with higher per 
capita incomes probably purchase higher insurance limits and insure more 
expensive automobiles, both driving up loss costs.  There is also no control 
for the effect of tort reforms other than the choice between contributory 
negligence and comparative fault.  For example, pro-tort reform advocates 
claim that caps on noneconomic damages lower loss costs in automobile 
accidents; Maryland has such a cap, but other states do not.
229
  Despite the 
absence of these controls, Johnson and his co-authors report that the differ-
ence from the study’s base year for loss costs on bodily injury and property 
damage is three percent greater in modified and five percent greater in pure 
comparative fault jurisdictions; these are not alarming increases, even if 
                                                          
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id. at 52.  In addition, Gardner cites two experts who also criticize Professor Johnson’s 
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 228.  See supra text accompanying notes 220–224. 
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true.
230
  This study, Johnson’s third attempt in research sponsored by those 
opposed to comparative fault, reaches conclusions that are inconsistent with 
the majority of studies described above. 
Due to the inherent fairness of comparative fault within a fault-based 
civil justice system, opponents of reform in Maryland have the burden of 
proving that a change to comparative fault would produce significant in-
creases in liability insurance premiums.  The available empirical evidence, 
fairly evaluated, is inconsistent.  Even if loss payments by automobile lia-
bility insurance carriers were to increase, much of the benefit would inure 
to carriers who provide first-party insurance to automobile accident victims.  
The victim would recover some of her property damages from the negligent 
driver’s liability insurance, thus reducing her recovery from her own colli-
sion carrier.  Further, her health insurance provider, whether a private insur-
er or the state (through Medicaid) would be subrogated to her claims 
against the negligent driver and his liability carrier, reducing their net out-
lays as a result of the accident (though increasing transaction costs). 
d.  Economic Contraction 
The final step in the adverse economic effects argument is that adopt-
ing comparative fault will create significant economic contraction, and 
Maryland will lose jobs.  There is no convincing evidence for this proposi-
tion.  Proponents of contributory negligence rely on a study prepared by the 
Regional Economic Studies Institute at Towson State University in 1997.
231
  
Among other things, the study concludes, “Maryland would lose approxi-
mately 20,800 jobs over a four-year period after switching to modified” 
comparative fault or 42,000 jobs over a four-year period after switching to 
pure comparative fault.
232
  The study, however, was unpublished, not peer 
reviewed, and was prepared for the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, an 
organization opposed to comparative fault.
233
 
Choice of law rules will play a role in the economic consequences to 
Maryland of switching to comparative fault.  The traditional choice of law 
rule in tort cases, including in Maryland, is known as lex loci delicti, loose-
ly translated to mean the place of the wrong.
234
  Many other jurisdictions 
have rejected lex loci delicti and employ a flexible “significant relationship 
to the occurrence” approach based on the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts 
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of Laws.
235
  On the one hand, if a Maryland business manufactures, sells, or 
distributes products nationwide that cause injury to a victim in another 
state, there is a good chance that state will apply its own laws, the vast ma-
jority of which include comparative fault instead of Maryland’s law of con-
tributory negligence.
236
  Simply because a business is located in Maryland 
does not mean that Maryland law applies when it causes harm.  On the oth-
er hand, if a manufacturer from another state, say Pennsylvania, causes 
harm in Maryland to a Maryland consumer, Maryland’s courts would apply 
Maryland law and a Pennsylvania court might do so as well.  Accordingly, 
in some cases, Maryland’s rule of contributory negligence subsidizes the 
business activities of competitors to Maryland firms. 
One of us (Gifford) has heard business representatives argue that con-
tributory negligence is a necessary counterweight to Maryland’s anti-
business regulatory, tax, and liability climates.  For the reasons stated 
above, this seems implausible.  But, even if it is true, the state should alter 
other policies that make the state noncompetitive.  Surely the state can find 
a better way to stay competitive than to do so on the backs of injured vic-
tims, particularly those who suffer catastrophic injuries. 
In concluding the discussion of contributory versus comparative fault 
on the merits, it is worth noting that even the author of one of the studies 
used to support contributory negligence stated: “The qualitative arguments 
in favor of comparative negligence [] are compelling.”237  We, again, 
acknowledge the possibility that insurance premiums may rise modestly 
with a switch to comparative fault.  We submit that the increased premiums, 
to the extent they would exist, would be worth the extra protection for Mar-
yland’s citizens.  By now, the states moving to comparative fault “all have 
enough experience to know that the new standard does not bring about ‘dis-
aster’ or ‘chaos.’”238  Perhaps the most significant factor in the debate 
should be that forty-six states have switched from contributory negligence 
to comparative fault and not one of them has switched back.  Even assum-
ing, arguendo, that increases in costs and insurance premiums may occur as 
a result of switching to comparative fault, no state that has made the change 
found such increases to be significant enough to outweigh the benefits of 
comparative fault. 
                                                          
 235.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 (1971).  See, e.g., Travelers In-
dem Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 46–47 (Del. 1991); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 
796, 802–03 (Pa. 1964). 
 236.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 145 cmt. d (1971). 
 237.  Winkler et al., supra note 216, at 122. 
 238.  Michael G. Shanley, Comparative Negligence and Jury Behavior 13 (RAND Graduate 
Institute, Paper No. P-7057-RGI, 1985), available at 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P7057.pdf. 
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C.  Pure or Modified?: Point and Counterpoint Between the Co-
Authors 
When switching to comparative fault, one of the primary issues is 
whether to adopt a pure or modified version.  We find ourselves disagree-
ing.  One of us (Robinette) supports pure comparative fault, and the other 
(Gifford) supports modified comparative fault.  Regardless, we are in 
agreement that either version would be superior to contributory negligence, 
and we would support the legislature in adopting either pure or modified 
comparative fault. 
1.  In Favor of Pure Comparative Fault (Robinette) 
Professor Robinette prefers pure comparative fault primarily because 
he believes a pure version most equitably apportions responsibility for inju-
ries.  Pure comparative fault allocates responsibility between the parties ac-
cording to their fault in causing the injuries.  Neither party is allowed to 
avoid any of their responsibility for the injuries by the architecture of the 
negligence system itself.  An injured victim (or her first-party insurer) will 
always bear her portion of responsibility for injuries because she suffered 
them.  There is no relieving the victim of responsibility for her injuries.  
She will pay the economic losses and suffer the noneconomic losses for at 
least her share of the injuries under any of the negligence systems.  The on-
ly question is whether the system in place relieves the injurer of her respon-
sibility for the victim’s injuries.  As seen, contributory negligence relieves 
an injurer of her portion of responsibility for injuries, even if the injurer’s 
portion is overwhelming.  Modified comparative fault is better, but it still 
relieves an injurer of her portion of responsibility if it is greater than the 
victim’s (or equal to the victim’s in several states). 
Again in the language of tort theory, pure comparative fault is superior 
to modified comparative fault in achieving corrective justice.  Recall that 
the essence of corrective justice is that a party who wrongs (injures) another 
must correct the wrong to restore the moral balance between them.
239
  Pur-
suant to the modified version, injurers may be relieved of the responsibility 
of correcting their wrongs.  If an injurer is less negligent than an injured 
victim (or even as negligent in several states), the injurer does not have to 
correct her wrong.  Therefore, modified comparative fault permits moral 
imbalances to remain in place in violation of corrective justice. 
One of the arguments advanced against the pure version is that a plain-
tiff should not recover if she is more culpable than the defendant.  As Pro-
fessor Arthur Best notes, however, framing the issue in terms of recovery 
                                                          
 239.  Id. 
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“invites a logical error.”240  Because “recovery” only applies to plaintiffs, 
any rule expressed in those terms will ignore the question of how it applies 
to defendants.
241
  If more neutral language is used, it becomes clearer that 
the fault of plaintiffs and defendants is treated quite differently.
242
  Best 
continues, “Characterized more generally, the idea that one whose conduct 
caused more than half of an injury should recover no damages is equivalent 
to the idea that a party who is more than half at fault for an injury should 
bear all the cost of that injury.”243  The shift in language “exposes the im-
balance in the modified comparative negligence approach to the question of 
what loss should be shifted when a party is more than 50% negligent.”244  
When a plaintiff is over half at fault, she bears the entire loss, but when a 
defendant is over half at fault, she only bears her proper portion of respon-
sibility.
245
  Once again, there is no argument advanced as to why a plain-
tiff’s fault is worse than a defendant’s fault so as to justify the disparate 
treatment. 
Combined with the disparate treatment of plaintiffs and defendants, 
modified comparative fault treats similarly situated people very differently 
based on which side of the “break-point” the jury deems them to fall.246  
This is true of both parties.  As Professor Gary Schwartz stated: 
 [O]ne becomes very uncomfortable with the fairness implica-
tions of [the] ‘break-point’ feature—the feature that allows the 
entire liability to turn on a slight difference in the assessed negli-
gence of the parties.  To distinguish in an all-or-nothing way be-
tween the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who is deemed 
forty-five percent negligent and the party who is deemed fifty-
five percent negligent is substantially unfair—especially when the 
relevant judgments are imprecisely and unpredictably rendered 
after the event by an ad hoc lay jury.
247
 
In addition to fairness in apportionment of responsibility, pure com-
parative fault also spreads losses better than does modified.
248
  In any case 
in which an injured victim is more negligent than the defendant (or as neg-
ligent in several states), the injured victim can receive compensation from 
the injurer under pure comparative, but not modified comparative, negli-
                                                          
 240.  Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2007). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. at 12–13. 
 243.  Id.  
 244.  Id. at 13.   
 245.  Id. at 10.   
 246.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 247.  Id. (quoting Schwartz, supra note 140, at 727). 
 248.  Id. 
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gence.
249
  Moreover, adopting modified comparative fault forces a legisla-
ture to make a number of other decisions that complicates the negligence 
system.  When adopting modified comparative fault, the legislature must 
choose where to set the break-point: forty-nine percent
250
 or fifty percent.
251
  
A legislature must also consider whether the fault of the defendants should 
be aggregated or considered separately
252
 and whether to let the jury know 
the consequences of findings of negligence for each party (sunshine rule) or 
not (blindfold rule).
253
  Pure comparative fault does not require any of these 
complications. 
2.  In Favor of Modified Comparative Fault (Gifford) 
Professor Gifford, like Robinette, favors either pure or modified com-
parative fault if the alternative is contributory negligence as a total bar to 
recovery.  He does, however, identify two reasons for adopting modified 
rather than pure comparative fault.  Recall that under modified comparative 
fault, if the jury’s allocation of fault to the plaintiff is fifty percent or less, 
the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the percentage of fault allocated to her 
or him multiplied by the amount of total damages.
254
  In short, if the plain-
tiff’s degree of fault is equal to or less than 50%, modified comparative 
fault functions the same as pure comparative fault.  If the plaintiff’s per-
centage of fault exceeds 50%, however, the plaintiff will recover nothing, 
just as he or she would under contributory negligence.
255
 
Gifford recognizes that pure comparative fault offers at least a couple 
of advantages over modified comparative fault.  First, because the business 
or insured personal defendant is almost always better able to distribute loss-
es widely, the principle of loss distribution argues in favor of pure compara-
tive fault.  When many insured parties each suffer a tiny loss reflected in 
premium increases or each consumer of goods or services pays a very small 
additional premium for their purchases, economists tell us that the per-
ceived loss to those who pay and the disruption to the economy are less 
                                                          
 249.  Id. at 51. 
 250.  Id. at 45. 
 251.  Id.  It may also consider 83.7%.  See William E. Westerbeke, In Praise of Arbitrariness: 
The Proposed 83.7% Rule of Modified Comparative Fault, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 991, 995 (2011) 
(exploring “the appropriateness of either 49% or 50% as the only cutoff points at which compara-
tive fault allocation ends”). 
 252.  Westerbeke, supra note 251, at 1029–32. 
 253.  Id. at 1026–29. 
 254.  Best, supra note 240, at 8. 
 255.  Id. at 7–8.  In a small number of jurisdictions, if the jury finds the plaintiff and the de-
fendant to have been equally at fault, the plaintiff recovers nothing.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Appala-
chian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 884 n.12 (W. Va. 1979). 
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than if a few victims suffer much larger losses.
256
  There are two responses 
to the loss distribution argument.  First, tort liability—unlike workers’ 
compensation benefits, other no-fault systems, or the proceeds of health or 
medical insurance policies—always requires something more than loss dis-
tribution to justify liability.  Further, today’s widespread prevalence of first 
party insurance—particularly with the pending advent of national health in-
surance—means that victims frequently are able to distribute at least as 
many economic losses through first-party insurance and with much lower 
transaction costs than through liability payments from tortfeasors or their 
insurers. 
The second purported advantage of pure comparative fault is that 
slight differences in how the jury allocates fault to the parties may result in 
the victim recovering substantial damages or nothing at all.  For example, if 
the plaintiff suffers $1,000,000 in damages and the jury allocates 49.9% of 
the fault to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will recover $501,000.  If the jury allo-
cates 50.1% of the fault to the plaintiff, the plaintiff then recovers nothing.  
This objection to modified comparative fault can be minimized, if not elim-
inated, however, by informing the jury of the consequences of its alloca-
tions of fault to the parties.
257
  Obviously, this approach again enables jury 
nullification, which we have criticized earlier,
258
 but only in the handful of 
cases where the jury’s determination of the plaintiff’s degree of fault is rea-
sonably close to the statutorily determined line for distinguishing reduced 
liability from nonliability. 
Many believe that the biggest advantage of the modified version of 
comparative fault is the role it plays in screening cases and reducing the in-
crease in the number of claims resulting from the abrogation of contributory 
negligence as a total bar to recovery and the adoption of comparative fault.  
The attorney deciding whether to file a claim may decline to do so if she be-
lieves it is likely that the jury would find the plaintiff to be more at fault 
than the defendant.  Once the parties complete the discovery process, if the 
undisputed facts suggest that the plaintiff is more at fault than the defend-
ant(s), the court may grant a summary judgment.
259
  Finally, if the trial 
court judge believes after the submission of evidence that no reasonable ju-
ry could find that the defendant was as much or more at fault than the plain-
                                                          
 256.   Best, supra note 240, at 7–8. 
 257.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 3.05(b)(1).  Compare Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 
690–91 (Idaho 1978) (stating that the jury should ordinarily be told of consequences of its alloca-
tion of fault), with McGowan v. Story, 234 N.W.2d 325, 329–30 (Wis. 1975) (stating that the jury 
should not be told of consequences). 
 258.  See supra text accompanying notes 150–155. 
 259.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. §7, reporters’ note 
cmt. a (2000) (“Modified comparative responsibility . . . provide[s] trial courts with a basis for 
summary judgment in relatively weak cases.”).  
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tiff, the judge may grant a directed verdict.  Admittedly, the modified ap-
proach to comparative negligence is a crude tool to use in winnowing those 
cases that are to be heard by a jury. 
Many legislators believe, as a principle of justice, that when the con-
duct of a contributorily negligent plaintiff is more at fault than that of the 
combined defendants, the plaintiff should not recover.
260
  Accordingly, 
those legislatures decline to adopt pure comparative fault.
261
  This issue ap-
pears most vividly in the case in which the plaintiff is the more at-fault par-
ty but also suffers the greater amount of damages, and the parties are not 
insured.
262
  If the defendant in such a case is also injured but to a lesser ex-
tent than the plaintiff, and the defendant counterclaims for her injuries 
against the plaintiff who was also negligent, the more at-fault party (the 
plaintiff) will realize a net recovery at the expense of the less at-fault party 
(the defendant).
263
 
These reasons help explain why thirty-three states have adopted modi-
fied comparative fault, but only twelve have adopted pure comparative 
fault.
264
  Modified comparative fault is a political compromise that often has 
enabled legislatures to agree to adopt a form of comparative fault, but it is 
also a compromise justified by real-world experience with comparative 
fault.
265
  It reduces both claims frequency and the number of cases heard by 
the jury by screening out those where the plaintiff is clearly more at fault 
than the defendant(s) and eliminates the possibility of the more at-fault 
plaintiff recovering. 
III.  RESOLVING ANCILLARY ISSUES 
One of the perceived benefits of the legislature adopting comparative 
fault is the ability to address related issues comprehensively, though most 
legislatures have neglected to do so.  The most frequently discussed ancil-
lary issues are: treatment of multiple tortfeasors under a modified compara-
                                                          
 260.  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §  156 (2003).  
 261.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 3.02.  After two states’ highest court had adopted pure 
comparative negligence, the legislature enacted a modified comparative negligence statute.  Id. § 
3.02 n.21 (referencing “735 ILCS 5/2-1116, effective Nov. 25, 1986,” and “IOWA CODE ANN. ch 
668, effective July 1, 1984”). 
 262.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 9 cmt. a (2000) 
(discussing and providing illustrations of “exception[s] for liability insurance”). 
 263.  Id.  Of course, even under pure comparative fault, the party whose conduct is most cul-
pable bears the larger share of responsibility for all the damages resulting from the accident, in-
cluding those he or she sustains as a victim of the accident.  Id. § 9 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
 264.  Robinette & Sherland, supra note 133, at 44; see also Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Co-
lumbia, 432 Md. 679, 727 n.24, 69 A.3d 1149, 1178 n.24 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“South Dakota, 
although considered to be a comparative fault jurisdiction, applies neither a pure nor modified sys-
tem.  Instead, it applies a slight negligence standard.”). 
 265.  Best, supra note 240, at 13–15. 
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tive fault analysis; whether to compare a plaintiff’s negligence against a de-
fendant’s intentional, reckless, willful and wanton, or grossly negligent 
conduct; and the effect of adopting comparative fault on the doctrines of as-
sumption of risk and last clear chance.
266
 
A.  Treatment of Multiple Tortfeasors 
The modified version of comparative fault poses another basic issue.  
In a case involving multiple tortfeasors, should the comparison of the de-
grees of fault of the parties be between the plaintiff and each defendant in-
dividually, or between the degree of fault of the plaintiff and the combined 
degrees of fault of all defendants?
267
  An overwhelming number of jurisdic-
tions compare the plaintiff’s degree of fault with the aggregated degrees of 
fault of the combined defendants.
268
  We endorse this approach.  If the 
comparison is made between the plaintiff and each individual defendant, 
                                                          
 266.  We decline to enter the thicket of whether comparative fault should be applied to strict 
products liability and other strict liability claims, an issue that probably justifies an article in and 
of itself.  The Maryland Chamber of Commerce asserts: “In Maryland, we also have a rule of 
‘strict liability’ for the manufacturers of certain products—anything from power mowers to lip-
stick.  Under strict liability, the jury is not allowed to consider any offsetting negligence of the 
plaintiff.  None.”  Kathy Snyder, Maryland Should Be Careful About Upending Its Liability Law, 
BALT. SUN, Oct. 15, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-10-15/news/bs-ed-liability-
20121015_1_comparative-fault-contributory-negligence-liability-law (noting that Snyder is the 
president and CEO of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce). 
Snyder’s statement is arguably misleading.  Maryland has adopted, as a defense to strict 
products liability, what the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS refers to as “contributory negli-
gence,” but the Maryland courts call “assumption of risk.”  Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 
337, 346, 363 A.2d 955, 960 (1976) (specifically adopting defense based on Comment n to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965)).  Comment n is specifically labeled in the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) as “contributory negligence.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
402(A) cmt. n. (1965).  In fact, this defense applies when plaintiff’s conduct satisfies the require-
ments of both traditional contributory negligence, that is, the plaintiff’s conduct is “unreason-
abl[e],” and assumption of risk, that is, the plaintiff “voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to 
encounter a known danger.” Id. 
Maryland also recognizes product misuse to a defense in products liability actions.  See 
Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 596, 495 A.2d 348, 355 (1984) (holding that 
there is no liability when a product is “misuse[d]” in a manner that is not reasonably foreseeable). 
Together, these defenses of “assumption of risk” and “misuse” in products cases capture the 
same conduct on the part of the plaintiff that in most jurisdictions traditionally barred recovery in 
products litigation under the label of “contributory negligence.”  More recently, some states adopt-
ing comparative fault have allowed the plaintiff’s recovery to be reduced but not barred by the 
plaintiff’s unreasonable failure to discover a product risk, which does not bar liability under Mary-
land law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 17 cmt. d (1998) (reporting that 
many courts now reject the older rule “that when the plaintiff’s negligence consists solely in the 
failure to discover the defect in the product, no reduction of damages [on the basis of apportion-
ment of responsibility] is warranted”). 
 267.  See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 51, §22.16; Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry J. Phil-
lips, Comparative Fault in Tennessee: Where Are We Going, and Why Are We in This Handbas-
ket?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 765, 797–800 (2000). 
 268.  Id. at 797 n.188. 
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then a plaintiff found to be forty percent at fault would be able to recover 
sixty percent of damages if only one defendant is involved, but nothing if 
two equally culpable defendants are held liable.  The more defendants that 
are joined in the action, the more egregious the problem becomes.  If the 
plaintiff is found to be only twenty percent at fault, and five defendants are 
joined and each is found to be sixteen percent at fault, the plaintiff recovers 
nothing.  This creates an enormous incentive for an initially sued defendant 
to attempt to add as many co-defendants as possible.  Further, comparing 
plaintiff’s fault to that of the combined defendants creates greater incentives 
for defendants to settle cases before they go to trial.  Most significantly, ag-
gregating the fault of defendants is most consistent with allocating respon-
sibility according to fault.  Without aggregation, a defendant is likely to be 
relieved of her responsibility for her fault more often than pursuant to an 
aggregation rule. 
Multiple tortfeasors create yet another issue: whether responsibility 
should be apportioned only among parties to the lawsuit or whether “ab-
sent” tortfeasors should be included as well.  There are many reasons a po-
tential defendant may not be present when the factfinder apportions respon-
sibility.  The potential defendant may be bankrupt, immune, unknown, 
beyond the court’s jurisdiction, or have already settled with the plaintiff.  
We believe that considering the fault of all entities that contributed to the 
accident when responsibility is apportioned is the rule most consistent with 
the theme of apportioning responsibility based on fault.  Removing a poten-
tial tortfeasor from consideration can seriously alter a factfinder’s view of 
the relative responsibility of remaining parties.  Consideration of all poten-
tial tortfeasors allows the factfinder a more comprehensive understanding of 
how the injuries occurred.
269
  Moreover, considering the fault of nonparties 
is not necessarily favorable to either side.  On the one hand, if a modified 
comparative fault rule is adopted, consideration of the fault of nonparties 
may allow the factfinder to understand that a plaintiff’s responsibility was 
below the cutoff threshold.  On the other hand, from the defense perspec-
tive, including the responsibility of nonparties may reduce the percentage of 
damages each defendant is responsible to pay. 
B.  Comparing Plaintiff’s Negligence Against Defendant’s Intentional, 
Reckless, Willful and Wanton, or Grossly Negligent Conduct 
During the contributory negligence era, many states adopted the 
“greater-degree-of-blame exception”; pursuant to the exception, contributo-
                                                          
 269.  Cheri D. Green & Michael K. Graves, Allocation of Fault: Joint Tortfeasors in Court and 
the Ones Who Should Be, 63 MISS. L.J. 647, 656 (1994) (likening jury consideration of only the 
defendants in court to “judg[ing] a forest by observing just one tree”). 
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ry negligence was not a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery if the defendant’s 
fault was greater by degree.
270
  If a defendant was grossly negligent, reck-
less, willful and wanton, or had engaged in intentional misconduct, the 
plaintiff was not barred from recovery by her own negligence, and, in fact, 
her recovery was not reduced by her own misconduct.  This exception was 
another attempt to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence.  
When, however, a comparative responsibility analysis is performed with the 
goal of apportioning responsibility based upon fault, it makes sense to com-
pare a plaintiff’s negligence with, say, a defendant’s reckless conduct.  If, 
indeed, the defendant’s conduct is so much worse than the plaintiff’s, the 
apportionment of responsibility will so indicate.  The vast majority of juris-
dictions allow the comparison between a lesser and a greater degree of 
fault.
271
  Though, of course, there is no need to categorize degrees of fault if 
they are all included in the analysis. 
An exception exists if the defendant has engaged in intentional mis-
conduct.  The argument is that intentional misconduct is different in kind 
from negligent or even reckless behavior and should not be compared with 
it.
272
  Most of the comparative fault statutes and most of the cases on the 
subject are in accord.
273
  We endorse the general rule: if a person acts with 
intent to harm another,
274
 that person should be responsible for the full ex-
tent of the damages caused, even if the selected victim is “gullible or fool-
ish.”275  Moreover, this rule is consistent with extant intentional tort juris-
prudence, in which a victim’s negligence is not a defense to an intentional 
tort. 
C.  Effect on Assumption of Risk 
Assumption of risk is a phrase with multiple meanings that often ob-
scures more than it clarifies.  In Maryland, assumption of risk, as a defense 
to a plaintiff’s claim for negligence, can mean one of three things: the “ex-
press consent perspective,” “the duty perspective,” or the “misconduct de-
fense perspective.”276  Assumption of risk is also categorized as express or 
                                                          
 270.  ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 147. 
 271.  FRANKLIN, RABIN, & GREEN, supra note 191, at 446. 
 272.  Id.   
 273.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 5.02. 
 274.  We recognize there are torts referred to as intentional torts, such as informed consent, 
that do not require intent to harm, but only require intent to make contact.  These torts should not 
be excepted from a comparative negligence analysis.   
 275.  Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 n.7 (Minn. 1986). 
 276.  Crews v. Hollenbach, 126 Md. App. 609, 627, 730 A.2d 742, 752 (1999) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Miller v. Michalek, 13 Md. App. 16, 23, 281 A.2d 117, 121 n.5 
(1971) (citing PROSSER ON TORTS, § 67 (3d ed. 1964)) (articulating the three categories of as-
sumption of risk). 
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implied, with implied further categorized as primary (“duty perspective”) or 
secondary (“misconduct defense perspective”).277  Switching to compara-
tive fault should only affect the “misconduct defense perspective”; express 
assumption of risk and assumption of risk as part of a duty analysis should 
remain unaltered. 
1.  Express Assumption of Risk 
Express assumption of risk occurs when a plaintiff, in advance, pro-
vides “express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation toward him, 
and to take his chance of injury from a known risk arising from what the de-
fendant is to do or leave undone.”278  This variation of assumption of risk 
overlaps with contract law and the express consent is usually provided in 
writing.  Such consents, often referred to as waivers, are familiar to many 
consumers in health club membership contracts, skiing tickets, and many 
other types of contracts.  Because of its contractual nature, express assump-
tion of risk should not be affected by an alteration in the tort doctrine of 
contributory negligence.
279
  Thus, even comparative fault jurisdictions ab-
rogating assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery continue to hold 
that express assumption of risk, so long as it is enforceable, is an absolute 
defense in cases of negligence.
280
 
2.  Assumption of Risk as Duty (Implied Primary) 
Pursuant to the duty perspective, “the plaintiff voluntarily enters into 
some relationship with the defendant, with the knowledge that the defend-
ant will not protect him against one or more future risks that may arise from 
the relation.  He may then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly consenting to 
the negligence.”281  Because this is part of the already existing duty analy-
                                                          
 277.  Kelly v. McCarrick, 155 Md. App. 82, 94, 841 A.2d 869, 876 n.6 (2004) (categorizing 
primary and secondary implied assumption of risk); ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 183. 
 278.  Crews, 126 Md. App. at 627, 730 A.2d at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 279.  See, e.g., Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369, 375 (Idaho 1985) (distinguishing “consent” 
from “assumption of risk”). 
 280.  Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 n.2 
(S.C. 1998) (providing a string citation of jurisdictions retaining express assumption of risk). 
 281.  Crews, 126 Md. App. at 627, 730 A.2d at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
court then clarified the concept by explaining that“[i]n its primary sense the plaintiff’s assumption 
of a risk is only the counterpart of the defendant’s lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that 
risk.”  Id. at 753 (emphasis omitted) (citing Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md. App. 116, 135, 
488 A.2d 523 (1985), aff'd, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987) (quoting 2 F. Harper & F. James, 
The Law of Torts § 21.1, at 1162 (1956))).  The gist of implied primary assumption of the risk is 
that a defendant simply has no duty to take reasonable care.  For example, under the traditional 
common law, if a spectator at a ball park sat in an unscreened section and was struck by a foul 
ball, many courts held that because this risk was one “inherent in and incident to the game,” the 
operator of the ballpark did not owe a duty to the patron to protect her or him from the natural 
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sis, we believe it only adds confusion to the law to rename the concept.
282
  
Regardless, switching to comparative fault will have no effect on this type 
of assumption of risk either.  Contributory negligence is a defense to a 
claim of negligence and only becomes relevant after a plaintiff has proved 
her prima facie case.  Implied primary assumption of risk is part of the duty 
analysis, which is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  As such, this form 
of assumption of the risk is “subsumed in the principle of negligence it-
self.”283  The alteration of a defense should not affect the prima facie negli-
gence case. 
3.  Assumption of Risk as Misconduct (Implied Secondary) 
The final type of assumption of risk, implied secondary, is established 
when a defendant proves: (1) the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk of dan-
ger; (2) the plaintiff appreciated that risk; and (3) the plaintiff voluntarily 
encountered the risk of danger.
284
  In determining whether implied second-
ary assumption of risk should be retained as a complete bar to recovery, it is 
necessary to determine its relationship to contributory negligence.  On the 
one hand, if implied secondary assumption of risk can be best analogized to 
contributory negligence, it makes sense to subsume it as part of the compar-
ative fault analysis.  On the other hand, if implied secondary assumption of 
risk can be more closely analogized to another concept—consent is usually 
the proffered alternative
285—then implied secondary assumption of risk 
should be retained as an absolute bar to recovery, just as consent is an abso-
lute bar to an intentional tort.
286
 
In Maryland, implied secondary assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence are distinct defenses.
287
  The “two defenses completely overlap 
and should be presented as one defense when the risk allegedly assumed is 
unreasonable.”288  The overlap occurs because the assumption of an unrea-
sonable risk is, itself, unreasonable behavior.
289
  Thus, Maryland law al-
                                                          
risks of the game.  Brown v. S.F. Ball Club, Inc., 222 P.2d 19, 20 (Cal. 1950).  Assumption of the 
risk prevented liability even if the particular victim was unaware of the risk. 
 282.  See id. at 21 (noting that by providing a screened section the baseball club had “fully dis-
charged its duty towards” the plaintiff). 
 283.  Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977). 
 284.  ADM P’ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 90–91, 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997). 
 285.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 9.01[a]. 
 286.  See id. § 9.05[b] (stating that “[p]robably the strongest argument for retention of assump-
tion of risk as a complete defense is” the argument that contributory negligence is about fault and 
assumption of risk is more like consent). 
 287.  S&S Oil, Inc. v. Jackson, 428 Md. 621, 631, 53 A.3d 1125, 1131 (2012). 
 288.  Id.  
 289.  Id. 
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ready recognizes substantial overlap between the two defenses.
290
  The only 
portion of implied secondary assumption of risk that is not identical to con-
tributory negligence is the knowing assumption of a reasonable risk: “the 
facts may warrant conflicting results under the theories, for example, ‘[a] 
plaintiff who proceeds reasonably, and with caution, after voluntarily ac-
cepting a risk, not unreasonable in itself, may not be guilty of contributory 
negligence, but may have assumed the risk.’”291 
Moreover, the analogy to consent, as Schwartz notes, is “usually fic-
tional.”292  True consent occurs when “the plaintiff manifests his agreement 
to the actual invasion of his interest in person or property.”293  By contrast, 
“when the plaintiff assumes a risk, he volunteers to be subject to a possible 
injury.  This is a giant step away from consent when viewed from the per-
spective of whether the plaintiff has actually agreed to hold the defendant 
harmless for the risk.”294  Therefore, Maryland law acknowledges the kin-
ship between contributory negligence and implied secondary assumption of 
the risk, and the alternative analogy is “usually fictional.”295 
Furthermore, and most importantly, retaining implied secondary as-
sumption of risk as a complete defense could seriously undermine the com-
parative fault policy of apportioning responsibility based on fault.
296
  The 
fact that a plaintiff voluntarily assumed a risk does not negate a defendant’s 
fault.  Retaining assumption of risk as an absolute bar could prevent a plain-
tiff from recovery even if her conduct was reasonable.  Such a result by-
passes the core comparative fault goal of assessing the relative fault of the 
plaintiff and defendant(s).
297
  For this reason, the vast majority of states 
adopting comparative fault have also abolished assumption of risk as an ab-
solute bar to recovery.
298
 
D.  Effect on Last Clear Chance 
Last clear chance is an exception to contributory negligence by which 
a contributorily negligent plaintiff can still recover from a negligent defend-
ant if the plaintiff makes “‘a showing of something new or sequential, 
which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail 
                                                          
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 419, 31 A.3d 583, 603 (2011) (quot-
ing Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 281, 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991)). 
 292.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, § 9.01[a]. 
 293.  Id. § 9.05[c]. 
 294.  Id.  
 295.  Id. § 9.01[a]. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 598 S.E.2d 565, 573 
(S.C. 1998). 
 298.  Id. at 569. 
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himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence.’”299  The crux 
of the exception is the phrase “fresh opportunity,” for the defendant must 
have a chance to avoid the injury after the plaintiff’s act put her in peril.300 
If comparative fault becomes the law of Maryland, last clear chance 
should be abrogated for two reasons.  First, last clear chance was adopted as 
a means to mitigate the harshness of contributory negligence.
301
  If con-
tributory negligence is replaced, there will be no harshness left to mitigate.  
Second, the effect of last clear chance is to provide a plaintiff with full 
damages, in spite of plaintiff’s negligence in causing her injuries.302  Full 
recovery under these circumstances is inconsistent with apportioning re-
sponsibility based on fault.  Of course, a jury should take into consideration 
whether a defendant had a chance to avert the injuries that was both last and 
clear.  That consideration, however, should be performed in the context of a 
comparative fault analysis and not as a way to provide a plaintiff full dam-
ages when she is partially at fault. 
IV.  WHAT’S GOOD FOR THE GOOSE . . . : MODIFICATION OF JOINT AND 
SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THE ADMISSION OF SEAT BELT NONUSE 
In Part II, we proposed allocating damages between the plaintiff and 
the defendant according to the parties’ respective degrees of culpability, a 
change that would favor plaintiffs.  In this Part, we apply the same principle 
of apportioning liability according to fault to both the current doctrine of 
joint and several liability
303
 and the Maryland statute that prevents defend-
ants from introducing evidence of the nonuse of seat belts.
304
  These chang-
es would benefit defendants. 
A.  Replacing Joint and Several Liability with Reapportionment of 
Unpaid Shares 
In this section, we consider five alternative approaches to the issue of 
how the liability of multiple, independent tortfeasors, each of whose con-
duct is necessary to produce the victim’s indivisible harm, should be han-
dled when the court cannot require one or more of the tortfeasors to pay its 
fair share because the tortfeasor is judgment-proof, immune from liability, 
or beyond the jurisdiction of the court.  We begin by rejecting the two ex-
                                                          
 299.  Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 638, 495 A.2d 838, 847 (1985) (quoting 
Sanner v. Guard, 236 Md. 271, 276, 203 A.2d 885, 888 (1964)). 
 300.  Wooldridge v. Price, 184 Md. App. 451, 462, 966 A.2d 955, 961 (2009). 
 301.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 734, 69 A.3d 1149, 1182 (2013) 
(Harrell, J., dissenting); ABRAHAM, supra note 138, at 147. 
 302.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, §7.02. 
 303.  See infra notes 343–349, 360–364 and accompanying text. 
 304.  See infra notes 376–385 and accompanying text. 
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treme, polar opposite approaches, the plaintiff-friendly rule of joint and 
several liability
305
 and the defendant-friendly rule of several liability.
306
  We 
then consider three “compromise” approaches—treating economic and non-
economic damages differently,
307
 providing for joint and several liability 
only when a particular defendant’s share of liability exceeds a specified 
threshold,
308
 and reallocating the absent or judgment-proof tortfeasor’s un-
paid share among the remaining parties according to their respective shares 
of fault.
309
  We conclude that the last alternative is the one most consistent 
with a tort system allocating liability according to fault.
310
 
B.  Joint and Several Liability: Maryland’s Current Approach 
Under the traditional Anglo-American doctrine of joint and several li-
ability, each of two or more independent tortfeasors who contributes con-
currently to the plaintiff’s indivisible harm is subject to liability for the en-
tire harm.
311
  The plaintiff has the choice of collecting the entire judgment 
from one defendant, the entire judgment from another defendant, or recov-
ering portions of the judgment from various defendants, as long as the 
plaintiff’s entire recovery does not exceed the amount of the judgment.312  
Once a jurisdiction such as Maryland adopts contribution among tortfea-
sors
313
 that enables a defendant who pays more than its fair share
314
 to sue 
the other co-defendants for contribution, the most important consequence of 
joint and several liability is that if one of the defendants found liable is 
without assets and insurance or otherwise judgment-proof, beyond the ju-
risdiction of the court or immune from liability, the loss will fall on the co-
defendants and not on the plaintiff. 
                                                          
 305.  See infra Part IV.B.  
 306.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 307.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 308.  See infra Part IV.C.2 
 309.  See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 310.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 311.  See Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 178–79, 874 A.2d 919, 950 (2005) 
(stating “[w]e have long recognized that when tortfeasors act independently and their acts com-
bine to cause a single harm, the tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable”); HARPER, JAMES & 
GRAY, supra note 51, § 10.1. 
 312.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 (2000) 
(“When . . . some persons are jointly and severally liable to an injured person, the injured person 
may sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable damages from any jointly and severally 
liable person.”). 
 313.  See infra notes 365–367.  
 314.  Each defendant’s “fair share” is determined on either a pro rata basis (division into equal 
shares) or a proportionate basis (according to each defendant’s level of culpability).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 365–370. 
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Traditionally, joint and several liability for concurrent tortfeasors was 
justified on two grounds.  In the ancient régime when all jurisdictions treat-
ed contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery, if the more culpable 
but less resource-rich and insured defendant was unable to pay, the question 
of who should pay for the accident came down to a choice between a plain-
tiff who was without fault and a co-defendant whose negligence had been 
found to be a necessary cause of the plaintiff’s harm.315  In these circum-
stances, it made sense to hold the solvent defendant liable for the unpaid 
share of the co-defendant.  Once some form of comparative fault is adopted, 
however, the choice as to who should pay for the unpaid defendant’s share 
often is between a negligent co-defendant and a contributorily negligent 
plaintiff.  It was sometimes said that a plaintiff should be fully compen-
sated, but remember that under the old system, the plaintiff who had been 
contributorily negligent would not be compensated at all. 
The second traditional justification for joint and several liability was 
that the courts did not trust juries to make comparisons between the degrees 
of culpability of the defendants.
316
  If comparative fault is adopted, howev-
er, juries already will be making similar comparisons in allocating fault be-
tween the defendant and the plaintiff. 
The third argument in favor of joint and several liability is that the par-
ty paying the unpaid shares of the co-defendants is usually a business or a 
well-insured defendant.  As a result, the defendant paying more than its fair 
share is in a position to distribute losses widely either through insurance or 
by using its own resources generated from selling its products or services.
317
 
The doctrine of joint and several liability often means that in an acci-
dent caused by two defendants—a more egregiously culpable defendant 
with few if any assets and little or no insurance, and a less culpable, “deep 
pocket” defendant—the less culpable defendant ends up paying the vast 
bulk of the plaintiff’s damages.318  For example, in the colorful case of Walt 
                                                          
 315.  See Paul Bargren, Joint and Several Liability: Protection for Plaintiffs, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 453, 455–56 (1994) (discussing the history of joint and several liability); Gregory C. Sisk, 
Comparative Fault and Common Sense, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 31 (1994) (examining plaintiffs’ 
complete bar from recovery under a contributory negligence scheme); Richard W. Wright, The 
Logic and Fairness of Joint and Several Liability, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 45, 72 (1992) (examin-
ing joint and several liability in the context of contributory negligence).  See also generally Wil-
liam L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 422 (1937) (presenting 
differing interpretations of joint liability for concurrent defendants). 
 316.  Cf. DLS, NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS, supra note 184, at 11 (noting that courts’ distrust of 
juries to apportion liability has been a justification for contributory negligence). 
 317.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
27–28 (1970) (discussing the reduction of societal costs of accidents). 
 318.  Daniel Carvell et al., Accidental Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 43 
RAND J. ECON. 51, 51 (2012). 
  
2014] APPORTIONING LIABILITY IN MARYLAND TORT CASES 755 
Disney World Co. v. Wood,
319
 the plaintiff was injured at Walt Disney 
World when the car she was driving in the Grand Prix ride was rammed by 
another vehicle driven by her fiancé, Daniel Wood.
320
  The jury found that 
both Daniel Wood and Walt Disney World had been negligent, but that the 
plaintiff, Aloysia Wood, was also contributorily negligent.  It attributed 
eighty-five percent of the fault to Daniel, fourteen percent to Aloysia, and 
one percent to Walt Disney World.
321
  Prior to trial, however, Daniel and 
Aloysia were married,
322
 making Daniel immune from liability because of 
interspousal immunity.  Accordingly, after reducing the damages by four-
teen percent, Aloysia’s degree of fault, under Florida’s doctrine of pure 
comparative fault, the jury held Walt Disney World liable for eighty-six 
percent of the damages.
323
  In other words, even though the jury found that 
Aloysia’s conduct was fourteen times as egregious as that of Walt Disney 
World, she was able to recover eighty-six percent of her damages from the 
corporation.  Walt Disney World is but one example, admittedly an extreme 
one, of how joint and several liability leads to liability of “deep pocket” de-
fendants that many regard as unjust.  Often deep-pocket defendants include 
defendants whose conduct appears to be rather trivial when compared with 
that of the more culpable defendant whose negligence more directly leads to 
the plaintiff’s harm. 
Since the early 1980s, at least two-thirds of all American jurisdictions 
have either abrogated joint and several liability entirely or significantly 
modified it.
324
 
                                                          
 319.  515 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1987), superseded by statute as recognized in Fabre v. Marin, 623 
So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). 
 320.  Id. at 199. 
 321.  Id.  
 322.  Id. at 199 n.1. 
 323.  Id. at 199. 
 324.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 17 reporters’ note 
cmt. a, tbl. (1999) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT TABLE CLASSIFYING JURISDICTIONS AS JOINT AND 
SEVERAL, SEVERAL, OR HYBRID LIABILITY] (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, D.C., Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caroli-
na, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia as states still employing joint and several liability).  
Since the publication of RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Arkansas, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota and West Virginia have adopted statutes abolishing or modifying joint and several liabil-
ity.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-201 (2005) (imposing several but not joint liability); 42 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 7102(a.1)(1) (West 2013) (imposing liability proportional to fault); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-38-15 (2012) (noting joint and several liability does not apply where defendant contributed 
less than fifty percent of the total fault); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-8-15.1 (2004) (limiting liabil-
ity of a defendant less than fifty percent at fault); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-24 (LexisNexis 
2008) (limiting liability of a defendant less than thirty percent at fault). 
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C.  Proportionate or Several Liability 
Business groups and insurance companies generally claim that the ap-
propriate approach to assigning liability to joint tortfeasors is the one 
known as “several” or proportionate liability.  Under several (proportionate) 
liability, each defendant should pay only that portion of damages that paral-
lels what the jury determines is its proportionate share of fault when com-
pared with that of the other actors whose tortious conduct contributed to the 
harm.
325
  For example, assume the jury finds that the plaintiff (P) has sus-
tained $100,000 of damages and allocates sixty percent of the fault to the 
first defendant (D1), ten percent of the fault to the second defendant (D2), 
and thirty percent of the fault to P.  If both defendants are insured or sol-
vent, argue proponents of business and insurance interests, then D1 should 
pay $60,000, D2 should pay $10,000, and P should absorb $30,000 in un-
compensated losses because of P’s own fault.  If D1 is uninsured and judg-
ment-proof, immune from liability, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court, 
however, then under a several (proportionate) fault system, P will recover 
only $10,000 from D2.  About the same number of jurisdictions follow the 
proportionate or several liability method of allocating financial responsibil-
ity for damages as follow the joint and several liability method.
326
 
The argument that the fairest approach is that each co-defendant 
should pay only its proportionate share of damages that represents its de-
gree of fault is erroneous.  To return to our last example, it is true that D2 is 
paying only the percentage of damages it superficially appears that the ini-
tial allocation of damages suggests it should pay.  Under this logic, howev-
er, at the same time, the contributorily negligent plaintiff should be respon-
sible for only $30,000 (30% x $100,000) of its own losses.  Instead, under 
the several liability approach, it is being left uncompensated for $90,000 
(90% x $100,000).  In short, proportionate liability is unfair to the plaintiff 
in exactly the same way that joint and several liability is unfair to the more 
solvent defendant. 
The issue of how to handle absent tortfeasors arises again in several li-
ability or in any of the “compromise” approaches described below that in-
corporate at least some aspects of several liability,
327
 just as it does in allo-
cating fault between the plaintiff and defendants in the comparative fault 
determination.  For the reasons stated previously,
328
 we conclude that absent 
                                                          
 325.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § B18 (2000). 
 326.  See RESTATEMENT TABLE CLASSIFYING JURISDICTIONS AS JOINT AND SEVERAL, 
SEVERAL, OR HYBRID LIABILITY, supra note 324 (identifying Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Tennes-
see, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming as several liability jurisdictions). 
 327.  See infra text accompanying notes 329–349. 
 328.  See supra Part III.A. 
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tortfeasors should be assigned percentages of fault when considering the 
percentage of fault to be assigned to each co-defendant. 
Both joint and several liability and several (proportionate) liability are 
all-or-nothing propositions unfairly allocating responsibility for harm solely 
to either the plaintiff or the co-defendant.  We now turn to alternative ap-
proaches to allocating damages among the parties that are compromises.  
These compromises allocate damages in some way other than an all-or-
nothing approach. 
1.  Compromise 1: Treating Economic and Noneconomic Damages 
Differently 
The first of these compromises provides that the co-defendants are 
jointly and severally liable for economic damages, but only severally or 
proportionately liable for noneconomic damages.
329
  Economic damages in-
clude medical and rehabilitation costs, past and future wage loss, property 
damage, and similar “out-of-pocket” expenses.330  Noneconomic damages 
include other damages awarded for intangible harms such as pain and suf-
fering, disfigurement, emotional distress, and damages for loss of society, 
companionship, and consortium in the case of the injury or death of a fami-
ly member.
331
 
The differing treatment of the two type of damages suggests that eco-
nomic damages are more genuine or perhaps more important than noneco-
nomic damages.  This same distinction occurs elsewhere in the law govern-
ing damages for accidental harms.  For example, Maryland’s Workers’ 
Compensation System awards only economic damages—and in limited 
amounts—for workplace injuries.332  In a similar vein, a Maryland statute 
caps recovery for noneconomic damages but not economic damages.
333
 
There are several justifications for providing joint and several liability 
for economic damages, but only proportionate liability for noneconomic 
damages.  First, in those cases in which the economic costs of the accident 
threaten the solvency of the victim (plaintiff), joint and several liability for 
economic damages reduces the plaintiff’s risk of insolvency.334  Second, 
this alternative presumably is easier to administer than the other compro-
                                                          
 329.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § E18 (2000); see, e.g., 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.10 (2008) (limiting noneconomic damages to several liability). 
 330.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § E18 cmt. c (2000). 
 331.  Id.  
 332.  See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-621(a) (West 2008)(awarding compensation 
based off of the covered employee’s weekly wage). 
 333.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)(1) (West 2013). 
 334.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § E18 cmt. d (2000). 
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mises described below.
335
  It should be comparatively easy for the jury to 
determine separate amounts for economic and noneconomic damages.  Fi-
nally, this approach makes it likely that under subrogation agreements be-
tween plaintiffs and their first-party insurers, usually health insurers or, in 
the cases of patients covered by Medicaid, the state, these insurers will be 
reimbursed fully for their expenditures resulting from plaintiffs’ tortious in-
juries.
336
 
At the same time, giving greater priority to economic damages does 
raise other concerns.  For one, it disadvantages those, particularly children, 
the elderly, and the poor, who typically recover less economic damages be-
cause damages for lost income are either nonexistent or substantially lower 
than for more affluent adults.
337
  Further, economic damage awards tend to 
be higher for men than for women, whose incomes often lag behind those 
of comparably credentialed and experienced men.
338
  These groups would 
be comparatively disadvantaged by any reform that retains joint and several 
liability for economic damages, but only several liability for noneconomic 
damages. 
In addition, some injuries may be extremely traumatic and result in 
enormous emotional or physical pain, and yet may not result in substantial 
medical bills and loss of income that are proportionate to the amount of 
noneconomic damages experienced by the victim.  Consider the young 
woman whose exposure to a dangerously defective drug causes her to lose 
her ability to bear children.  She has not lost any income and her medical 
bills may be limited, but few would contest the assertion that she has expe-
rienced a significant harm and should be entitled to recover significant 
damages. 
                                                          
 335.  Id. (noting that the hybrid system can be administered more efficiently than certain real-
location systems). 
 336.  Id. § B19 cmt. l (noting that it is appropriate to return excess compensation when the 
plaintiff collects both full-tort damages and workers’ compensation payments). 
 337.  See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the 
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1280 (2004) (noting that these groups are disproportionately disad-
vantaged by caps on noneconomic damages); see also Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of 
Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 
75 (1994) (noting that use of race-based and sex-based economic data to calculate damage awards 
reduces the amount awarded for women and African Americans).  
 338.  See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, 
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 159 (2010) (discussing how “historical patterns of wage discrimination 
in the labor market are replicated in tort awards” due to the fact that gender-tables only compare 
women to other women); Chamallas, supra note 337, at 75 (noting that discrimination in setting 
pay rates influences valuations in the calculation of personal injury awards). 
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2.  Compromise 2: Joint and Several Only When Defendant’s Fault 
Exceeds Statutory Threshold 
The legislative compromise that most specifically targets the concern 
that a deep-pocket defendant whose fault is minor should not be forced to 
pay the bulk of the damages is one that imposes joint and several liability 
only if the defendant’s degree of fault exceeds a statutorily defined thresh-
old, such as twenty percent or fifty percent, but otherwise imposes only 
proportionate liability.
339
  As of 2000, ten states had adopted this ap-
proach.
340
  If the threshold is set at greater than fifty percent, the threshold 
approach also has the advantage of paralleling the logic of modified com-
parative fault under which the defendant is liable only if its degree of fault 
exceeds that of the plaintiff.
341
 
An often voiced criticism of the “threshold” approach is that any num-
ber chosen is arbitrary—simply a political compromise.  There is no princi-
pled way to defend holding a defendant who is ten percent at fault or fifty 
percent at fault in comparison with multiple other parties jointly and sever-
ally liable, but holding a defendant who is nine percent at fault or forty-nine 
percent at fault only severally liable.  Line-drawing, however, is inevitable 
any time that the law treats two groups of cases differently and the same 
concern arises with modified comparative fault.  The “arbitrariness” con-
cern could be ameliorated somewhat by informing the jury, when the judge 
provides instructions as to the law governing the case, of the consequences 
of the jury’s findings of the percentages of fault attributed to each party.  
Obviously, this solution in turn risks the possibility that the jury may game 
the system by choosing percentages that yield the outcome it regards as 
most fair and appropriate. 
                                                          
 339.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REAPPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § D18 (2000) (ap-
plying joint and several liability if the percentage of comparable responsibility assigned to a de-
fendant is in excess of the legal threshold); 2 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REP. STUDY, 
ENTER. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 151 n.28 (1991) (suggesting that a threshold for 
joint and several liability is an appropriate solution to prevent a defendant whose fault is minor in 
comparison with that of other parties from being held jointly and severally liable). 
 340.  See RESTATEMENT TABLE CLASSIFYING JURISDICTIONS AS JOINT AND SEVERAL, 
SEVERAL, OR HYBRID LIABILITY, supra note 324 (providing a table listing the ten “Threshold Ju-
risdictions” as Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Texas, and Wisconsin); see, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.067 (West 2008) (establishing threshold 
at fifty-one percent); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (West 2013) (establishing threshold at fifty 
percent); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013 (West 2008) (establishing threshold at 
fifty percent, but only if plaintiff is not contributorily negligent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15–5.3 
(West 2000) (establishing threshold at sixty percent). 
 341.  See supra notes 255–265 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Compromise 3: Reallocation of Liability for Unpaid Shares 
The last major compromise alternative is the one we find most princi-
pled.  Let us return to the hypothetical we discussed earlier.  As stated pre-
viously, the jury found that the plaintiff (P) sustained $100,000 of damages 
and allocated sixty percent of the fault to the first defendant (D1), ten per-
cent of the fault to the second defendant (D2), and thirty percent of the fault 
to the plaintiff.  D1, however, is uninsured and judgment-proof, immune 
from liability, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court.  Recall that under 
joint and several liability, in a comparative fault jurisdiction, P would re-
cover $70,000 from D2, the ten percent at-fault defendant.  On the one 
hand, this appears unfair because even though the jury found P’s own con-
tributory negligence to be three times as culpable as that of D2, P is absorb-
ing only thirty percent of the damages while D2 is paying seventy percent.  
On the other hand, in a proportionate or several liability jurisdiction, D2 
will pay only $10,000 and P, who is thirty percent at fault, is not being 
compensated for ninety percent of her damages.  Similarly under the 
“threshold” approach, assuming that the threshold is greater than ten per-
cent, P again is left holding the bag for ninety percent of the damages. 
There is a more principled approach—the reallocation method.  The 
reallocation method re-assesses the uncollectible portion of a judgment 
against a particular co-defendant to all other parties, including the plaintiff.  
When D1 cannot pay the $60,000 share that it should pay because of insol-
vency or immunity, the logical way to handle it is to reallocate D1’s share 
between P and D2.  With D1 out of the picture (at least in terms of collec-
tion), the share should be allocated to P and D2 according to their respec-
tive degrees of fault.  P’s original allocation of fault was thirty percent and 
D2’s was ten percent.  P is three times as much at fault as D2, and logically 
P should be responsible for three-quarters or seventy-five percent of D1’s 
share and D2 should be liable for one-quarter or twenty-five percent of D1’s 
share.  D2, therefore, is liable for twenty-five percent of $60,000—that is, 
$15,000—as well as the share originally allocated to it of $10,000.  Hence, 
D2 is liable for a total of $25,000.  If, however, P is free from contributory 
negligence, the co-defendants remain jointly and severally liable. 
Both the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
342
 and the Restatement of 
Torts
343
 endorse one variant of the reallocation method and many scholars 
approve of it,
344
 but fewer than a dozen jurisdictions follow it.
345
  In addi-
                                                          
 342.  UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 135, 137 (2008) (noting that reallo-
cation avoids unfairness). 
 343.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21 cmt. a (2000) (de-
scribing the reallocation method as the “fairest means of handling this problem”). 
 344.  See, e.g., Scott C. Hecht, Tort Reform Revisited: An Alternative to Missouri’s Compara-
tive Fault Settlement System, 62 UMKC L. REV. 247, 276 (1993); Michael K. Steenson, Joint and 
  
2014] APPORTIONING LIABILITY IN MARYLAND TORT CASES 761 
tion, courts have applied proportional reallocation of unpaid shares in deci-
sions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).346 
Upon first hearing the details of the reallocation approach, many intui-
tively find it to be too complex.  In actuality, however, all it requires the ju-
ry to do is establish the total damages and each party’s respective degree of 
fault—exactly the same functions for which it is responsible under a pro-
portionate liability system,
347
 often the preferred approach of business and 
insurance interests.  The trial judge, not the jury, completes the mathemati-
cal calculations, and we are confident that counsel will be happy to assist in 
these calculations. 
The Restatement (Third) reallocation approach impliedly begins with 
the assumption that initially the plaintiff can collect from any of the co-
defendants as if the liability of the co-defendants is joint and several.
348
  If a 
defendant who has paid more than its proportionate share of liability sues a 
co-defendant for contribution and is unable to collect, however, then reallo-
cation kicks in.
349
  Within a reasonable amount of time of the original 
judgment, the Restatement provision requires the defendant to move the 
court to reallocate the co-defendant’s unpaid share.350  The difficulty with 
the Restatement reallocation approach is that it mostly likely yields the 
same outcome as joint and several liability coupled with contribution.  Lit-
erally applied, it suggests that a defendant who has paid a disproportionate 
amount of the judgment would be able to reallocate the unpaid defendant’s 
                                                          
Several Liability in Minnesota: The 2003 Approach, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845, 853 (2004); 
Dunigan & Phillips, supra note 267, at 900 (concluding that adoption of reallocation method 
would “bring[] fairness to the law”). 
 345.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 h(g)(1) (West 2013) (applying reapportion-
ment to economic and noneconomic losses); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02, subd. 1–2 (West 2010) 
(providing for proportionate liability unless defendant’s share of fault is greater than fifty percent 
and providing for reallocation of proportional shares if such share is uncollectible); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §507:7-e(III) (LexisNexis 2009) (providing for reallocation under specified circum-
stances); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610(3) (West 2011) (providing for reallocation with specified ex-
ceptions); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-24(c)(1) (2008) (providing for reallocation with specified 
exceptions). 
 346.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).  See, e.g., Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 
919 F. Supp. 662, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that courts may use provisions of CERCLA to 
reallocate “orphan shares” among solvent responsible parties (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Charter Twp. of Oshtemo v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 898 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W.D. Mich. 1995) 
(providing that plaintiff and all defendants may be assigned shares in reallocation). 
 347.  See supra text accompanying notes 325–326. 
 348.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REAPPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21 reporters’ note to 
cmt. k (2000). 
 349.  See id. § C21 cmt. b (granting co-defendants the right to move for reallocation); UNIF. 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 135 (2008) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.610(3) 
(2011) (same). 
 350.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REAPPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C21 cmt. d (2000). 
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share by collecting proportionately from all remaining parties—including 
the plaintiff.  We believe that forcing the plaintiff to repay a portion of the 
judgment that has already been paid to him would always be awkward and, 
in most cases, unrealistic. 
As an alternative, we recommend several (proportionate) liability, not 
joint and several liability, as the default allocation of liability before reallo-
cation.  The plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that a co-defendant’s 
share cannot be paid because of insolvency, immunity, or lack of jurisdic-
tion.  At first glance, such an approach appears to be unfair to the plaintiff 
because the liability owed to him might not be resolved for an entire year 
and the expense and other burdens of reallocating shares would be on the 
plaintiff.  In most cases, this burden is more theoretical than real.  The abil-
ity of an insured defendant to pay a judgment within policy limits would be 
readily ascertainable at the time of the initial trial, as would the solvency of 
most corporate and other business defendants.  Together these defendants 
represent the vast bulk of defendants in tort actions.  In the unusual case in 
which this is not true, plaintiff and his counsel would have plenty of incen-
tive to establish the inability to collect on the co-defendant’s share as quick-
ly as possible because this would pave the way for reallocation.  In other 
cases, the facts necessary to establish that a co-defendant’s share would be 
unpaid because of her immunity or the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over 
her usually would be apparent at trial. 
C.  Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Changing from Joint and 
Several Liability 
Empirical studies suggest that the effects of reforms to the traditional 
doctrine of joint and several liability are unclear.  In one study, insurance 
professors Han-Duck Lee, Mark J. Browne, and Joan T. Schmit hypothe-
sized that the enactment of various alternatives to joint and several liability 
in nineteen states during the mid- to late-1980s would reduce the number of 
defendants joined in litigation because joint and several liability “encour-
age[s] litigation against multiple defendants in hopes of finding a deep 
pocket.”351  They also reported that an earlier survey of risk managers found 
that those surveyed “ranked modification of joint and several liability as 
second in importance among 58 legislative and regulatory risk management 
issues.”352  Despite this, the authors found only “weak evidence that state 
laws modifying joint and several liability rules have reduced claim fil-
ings.”353  In another study that evaluated the effects of joint and several lia-
                                                          
 351.  Lee, Browne & Schmit, supra note at 189, 298–99. 
 352.  Id. at 296. 
 353.  Id. at 309. 
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bility reform as well as other tort reform measures, W. Kip Viscusi and Pa-
tricia Born found that although insurance company profitability increased 
following the tort reforms of the mid-1980s, this same effect was observed 
in states that did not enact tort reforms and cautioned that these effects 
should not be attributed to tort liability reforms.
354
 
In yet another study, economists at Princeton and Columbia studied 
how abolition of joint and several liability in thirty-four states affected the 
safety precautions taken by potential tortfeasors.
355
  Somewhat surprisingly, 
the authors found that replacing joint and several liability with one of the 
alternatives outlined above tends to cause potential tortfeasors to be more—
not less—careful, and to reduce the incidence of accidental death resulting 
from tortious activity.
356
  The authors’ explanation for the finding is that 
when deep-pocket defendants are no longer held jointly and severally liable, 
they have an incentive to bring into court co-defendants whose actions con-
tributed to the accident even if these co-defendants are uninsured and judg-
ment-proof.
357
  By bringing these other co-defendants before the jury, the 
solvent defendant hopes to reduce the percentage of fault the jury attributes 
to it.
358
  This prospect, according to the authors, leads these judgment-proof 
defendants to exercise greater care to avoid the inconvenience of being sued 
even if they will not be held financially responsible.
359
  We are skeptical 
that most co-defendants who are judgment-proof are likely to be sophisti-
cated enough to anticipate that the likelihood of their being joined as co-
defendants will vary depending on the rule governing liability for jointly 
caused harm.  Still there appears to be no evidence that altering the tradi-
tional rule of joint and several liability adversely affects safety. 
D.  Our Recommendation Regarding the Liability of Joint Tortfeasors 
Often state legislative resolutions of how to divide damages among 
multiple parties combine elements of more than one of the five alternatives 
listed above in any of a seemingly infinite variety of carefully negotiated 
legislative compromises.
360
  Probably dozens of variations of how to handle 
the problem have been adopted by the fifty-one different jurisdictions. 
                                                          
 354.  W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, The General-Liability Reform Experiments and the Dis-
tribution of Insurance-Market Outcomes, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 183, 187–88 (1995). 
 355.  Carvell et al., supra note 318, at 52. 
 356.  Id. at 53, 74. 
 357.  Id. at 52. 
 358.  Id. 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 2013) (providing that joint and several liability 
does not apply when a defendant is found to be less than fifty percent at fault); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 31.610(3) (2009) (combining reapportionment approach with exceptions involving both speci-
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We strongly recommend against adoption of either of the “all-or-
nothing” approaches, neither of which allocate liability according to fault.  
To recap, joint and several liability, at least when the plaintiff is also found 
to be contributorily negligent, unfairly advantages the plaintiff.  In the same 
way, several liability unfairly advantages the defendants.  Each of the other 
options, which we have called the “compromise” approaches—treating 
economic and noneconomic damages differently, allowing for joint and 
several liability only when the defendant’s share of fault exceeds a statutori-
ly designated threshold, or the reallocation approach—presents its own dif-
ficulties.
361
 
We prefer the alternative that reallocates the liability of the defendant 
whose share is unpaid because of her insolvency or immunity to the remain-
ing parties, including both the plaintiff and the remaining co-defendants.
362
  
In principle, it clearly is the best alternative, though it does pose logistical 
challenges.  It most closely hews to handling the allocation of fiscal respon-
sibility in negligence cases in a matter that attributes liability according to 
levels of fault.  Trial courts capably handle reapportionment of liability 
shares in at least some instances in other jurisdictions.
363
 
By all accounts, Maryland judges should be at least as cognitively 
competent as their brothers and sisters in other states.
364
  We acknowledge 
that many attorneys, and presumably their clients as well, however, often 
dislike the approach because it leaves open the liability of the parties for an 
extended period after the initial judgment.  If, for this reason, the legislature 
prefers another approach, we would recommend either of the two other 
compromise approaches, the statutory threshold approach or the approach 
handling economic and noneconomic damages differently, the respective 
advantages and disadvantages of each we previously considered.  If the leg-
islature were to opt for the choice of establishing a statutory line dividing 
when a defendant’s liability would be joint and several instead of merely 
several (proportionate), we would recommend a threshold of approximately 
fifteen to twenty percent—admittedly an arbitrary choice, but one we be-
lieve to be a fair threshold—which would prevent joint and several liability 
                                                          
fied percentages of fault and comparison of fault percentages of party seeking reallocation and 
party from whom it is sought). 
 361.  See supra Part IV.C.1–3. 
 362.  See supra text accompanying notes 342–350. 
 363.  See supra text accompanying note 345. 
 364.  Even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ranks Maryland judges thirty-third among the fifty 
states in terms of judicial competence.  U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE 
LIAB. SYS. SURVEY, LAWSUIT CLIMATE: RANKING THE STATES 22 (2012), 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/lr_FinalWeb_PDF.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 
2014).  Sixteen of the seventeen states that are ranked below Maryland have adopted comparative 
fault.  See RESTATEMENT TABLE CLASSIFYING JURISDICTIONS AS JOINT AND SEVERAL, 
SEVERAL, OR HYBRID LIABILITY, supra note 324. 
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for “deep pocket” defendants whose fault is disproportionately low, but en-
able plaintiffs to collect all their damages (except those proportionate to 
their own fault) in other instances in which the co-defendant’s negligence 
was substantial compared with that of the other parties whose fault contrib-
uted to the plaintiff’s harm. 
E.  Contribution Among Tortfeasors 
Under current Maryland law, a joint tortfeasor who “has by payment 
discharged the common liability or has paid more than a pro rata share of 
the common liability” is entitled to recover “contribution” from the other 
tortfeasors.
365
  In most other jurisdictions, the right of contribution exists 
when one defendant has paid more than its proportionate share determined 
by its degree of fault
366
 in comparison with those of other tortfeasors.  In 
Maryland, however, the “pro rata” statutory language has been interpreted 
to mean “an equal share of the common liability, rather than a share based 
on an individual’s proportion of fault.”367 
If Maryland continues to employ joint and several liability as it does 
now, or at least provide for joint and several liability in limited circum-
stances, that is, in the case or economic damages
368
 or when a particular de-
fendant’s degree of fault exceeds the statutorily created threshold,369 then 
contribution would continue to play a role.  In accordance, however, with 
our recommendation that in negligence actions damages should be allocated 
according to the degrees of fault of the parties, we would recommend that 
Maryland replace the provision of its somewhat unusual contribution statute 
specifying that co-defendants share liability on a “pro rata” basis with the 
more typical provision that they share liability on a “proportionate” basis.  
Today, contribution statutes in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
use the term “proportionately” or at least interpret “pro rata” to mean pro-
portionately.
370
  Basing contribution on pro rata instead of proportionate 
shares may be one more reflection of the Maryland General Assembly’s 
                                                          
 365.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1402(b) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 366.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 23(b) (2000) 
(providing for contribution to a person who has paid more than his “comparative share of respon-
sibility”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 52, at 359 (“Many states have provided . . . for the application 
of pure comparative negligence in questions of contribution among tortfeasors.”).  The Illinois 
statute provides for contribution on a pro rata basis, see 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/2 (WEST 
2010), but then proceeds to define “pro rata” as proportionate.  Id. at 100/3. 
 367.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 733, 69 A.3d 1149, 1181 (2013) 
(Harrell, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-50.5-102 (2) (West 2005) 
(providing for contribution when a co-defendant has paid more than its pro rata share). 
 368.  See supra text accompanying notes 329–338. 
 369.  See supra text accompanying notes 339–341. 
 370.  See supra note 366 and accompanying text. 
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and/or the Court of Appeals’ distrust of the cognitive capability of jurors.  
We believe, based on a comparison of both median levels of educational 
achievement in Maryland
371
 and the performance of state students on na-
tionwide tests
372
 with those in other states, that Maryland jurors are perfect-
ly competent to quantify the respective degrees of fault of the parties in per-
centage terms. 
If, on the other hand, the General Assembly adopts either several (pro-
portionate) liability
373
 or the reallocation approach that we recommend,
374
 
then the need for a contribution action in negligence actions involving joint 
tortfeasors disappears in most cases.
375
  In jurisdictions employing several 
liability, the jury already will have established each defendant’s share of li-
ability without the need for a contribution action.  Similarly, under the re-
apportionment approach, the jury’s original allocations of liability, later ad-
justed by the judge to reflect the reapportionment of unpaid shares, avoid 
the need for contribution as a separate process. 
F.  Inadmissibility of Seat Belt Nonuse 
Maryland employs yet another “all-or-nothing” approach in refusing to 
apportion damages according to fault.  The Maryland statute requiring au-
tomobile drivers and their passengers to use seat belts includes a provision 
that evidence of the failure to use a seat belt is not admissible on the issue 
of contributory negligence.
376
  The legislative history suggests that the Gen-
eral Assembly passed the compulsory seat belt use statute reluctantly in or-
der to comply with a federal regulation pressuring states to enact seat belt 
mandates.
377
  No doubt plaintiffs’ trial lawyers lobbied for the inadmissibil-
ity provision. 
                                                          
 371.  More Maryland residents than residents of all the United States have earned a high school 
diploma (88.2% compared with 85.3%), a bachelor’s degree (35.7% compared with 27.9%), and 
an advanced degree (16.0% compared with 10.3%).  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, TABLE 233. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY STATE: 
1990 to 2009 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0233.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 372.  Maryland students test better than the nationwide average on nationwide standardized 
tests.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, STATE PROFILES, 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 373.  See supra text accompanying notes 325–326. 
 374.  See supra text accompanying notes 342–350. 
 375.  If neither the plaintiff nor the defendant chooses to join other potentially liable tortfeasors 
in the legal action and the defendant loses, however, the defendant might later sue other tortfea-
sors for contribution.  See supra text accompanying notes 365–370. 
 376.  MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 22-412.3(h)(1) (West 2012). 
 377.  According to an opinion of the Maryland Attorney General, “When it enacted the manda-
tory seat belt use legislation, the General Assembly apparently was acting, at least in part, in re-
sponse to a condition set forth in a federal regulation.”  Taxicab Drivers Not Required to Wear 
Seat Belts, 85 Op. Att’y Gen. 206, 211 n.12 (2000); see also 49 Fed. Reg. 28, 962 (July 17, 1984) 
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In most other jurisdictions today, evidence of the nonuse of seat belts 
is admissible to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery in a negligence action, usual-
ly as evidence of comparative fault,
378
 but sometimes under the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences that provides that plaintiffs owe a duty of reasona-
ble care to minimize the extent of injuries to themselves.
379
  Even though 
the failure to use a seat belt does not contribute to causing the accident itself 
(a necessary precondition for the application of the current doctrine of con-
tributory negligence), the failure to use a seat belt often causes an enhanced 
injury that is a foreseeable consequence of the failure to use a seat best,
380
 
just as an unsafe automobile design foreseeably enhances injuries resulting 
from a collision in “crashworthiness” cases.381 
It is sometimes claimed that requiring motorists to use seat belts grants 
the negligent driver of the other vehicle causing the accident an undeserved 
windfall.
382
  Yet this logic is tautological.  The Arizona Supreme Court rea-
soned, “[A]lthough some tortfeasors may pay less than they otherwise 
would, they will not pay less than they should.”383 
Allowing the jury to consider evidence of seat belt nonuse obviously 
does add a modest amount of complexity to the jury’s calculation of the 
plaintiff’s degree of fault under comparative fault.  The jury would be re-
quired to decide the extent to which the seat belt nonuse enhanced the plain-
tiff’s injury, and then determine the respective shares of liability of the par-
ties for that portion of the injury by determining the percentages of fault of 
the plaintiff for failure to wear the seat belt (and any other comparative fault 
on the plaintiff’s part) against the defendant’s proportion of comparative 
fault.  Again, we believe that Maryland jurors are up to the task, just as ju-
rors in other states are.  As with all other aspects of the jury’s findings, if 
                                                          
(providing that federal standards requiring passive restraints in automobiles would continue in 
effect unless at least two-thirds of nation’s population enacted mandatory seat belt legislation). 
 378.  See, e.g., Law v. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1135, 1137–39 (Ariz. 1988) (discussing the 
evolution of the “seat belt defense”). 
 379.  See, e.g., Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168–69 (N.Y. 1974) (approving instruction 
that allowed the jury to consider plaintiff’s failure to use seat belt in determining amount of dam-
ages). 
 380.  See Law, 755 P.2d at 1140 (stating that for “every person . . . motor vehicle accidents . . . 
are not only foreseeable but virtually certain to occur sooner or later”). 
 381.  See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216, 321 A.2d 737, 745 
(1974) (“In sum, ‘traditional rules of negligence’ lead to the conclusion that an automobile manu-
facturer is liable for a defect in design which the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen 
would cause or enhance injuries on impact, which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which 
in fact leads to or enhances the injuries in an automobile collision.”). 
 382.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: REAPPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3 reporters’ note 
cmt. b (noting “[s]ome courts used to forgive a plaintiff of pre-accident negligence that merely 
aggravated the injury . . . [because otherwise] counting the conduct would constitute a windfall for 
the defendant”). 
 383.  Law, 755 P.2d at 1144.  
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the jury’s finding is clearly wrong, the trial judge can enter judgment not-
withstanding the verdict
384
 or order a new trial.
385
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Maryland General Assembly will not find comprehensive reform 
of the role of fault in the state’s tort system to be easy.  For decades, lobby-
ists representing businesses and insurers have promised dire economic con-
sequences if Maryland replaces contributory negligence with comparative 
fault.  Even though this has not occurred in the other states that have adopt-
ed comparative fault, the frequent repetition of this argument has led many 
state policymakers to give it credence.  Not all the fault lies with businesses 
and insurance companies, however.  Just as vociferously as their defense 
counterparts, lobbyists for plaintiffs’ trial lawyers contend that any alterna-
tive to joint and several liability would wreak enormous injustice.  They al-
so managed to convince the General Assembly to pass a statute providing 
that seat belt nonuse is inadmissible in automobile accident actions at a time 
when mandatory seat belt laws were quite controversial.  Nearly three dec-
ades later, that statutory provision continues in effect, even though today 
five-year-old children know to fasten a seat belt. 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals defaulted in its constitutional obli-
gations as Maryland’s highest common law court.  It handed the political 
hot potato of contributory negligence, which it had created, back to the 
General Assembly, despite the court’s advantage in being somewhat insu-
lated from the powerful political forces that block common sense reform of 
these issues. 
What we have outlined in this Article is a balanced, principled ap-
proach to reform of Maryland’s negligence law, law supposedly based on 
attributing damages according to fault.  We begin with the replacement of 
contributory negligence with comparative fault, in either pure or modified 
form, a change that plaintiff’s counsel will cheer and businesses and insur-
ance companies will claim is catastrophic. 
We go on to incorporate the same principle of allocating damages ac-
cording to degrees of fault—and doing away with Maryland’s past habit of 
deciding such things on an all-or-nothing basis—by recommending pro-
defendant changes.  We recommend replacing joint and several liability 
with a statute that calls for allocating damages among co-defendants and 
other parties contributing to the harm according to their respective degrees 
of fault.  Importantly, we recommend that where a particular co-defendant’s 
share of liability cannot be paid because of insolvency or the defendant’s 
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immunity, that share should be reallocated among the remaining defendants 
and the plaintiff according to their respective degrees of fault.  Several or 
proportionate liability, that is, dumping the entire unpaid liability into the 
lap of the plaintiff, is the polar opposite of—and no more principled than—
the current law of joint and several liability. 
Finally, we identify the same fatal flaw of employing an all-or-nothing 
approach in not allocating damages according to fault in Maryland’s seat 
belt statute that provides that evidence of the nonuse of seat belts is inad-
missible in personal injury actions.  Perhaps the statute did not appear to be 
so ridiculous a decade or so after seat belt use became common.  Today’s 
law students, however, are shocked when they learn of the statute, as they 
should be. 
The balanced approach we have outlined appears to be a compromise.  
In fact, it probably will make none of the special interest groups happy.  
Each aspect of our proposal rests on the principle that in a liability system 
such as Maryland’s that fundamentally rests on negligence or fault-based 
liability in most instances, when each of several multiple parties are at fault 
and their actions contribute to an injury, damages should be allocated 
among them in accord with their respective degrees of fault.  Each of these 
proposals is well within the norms of the law governing accidental injury 
elsewhere in the United States.  In contrast, each aspect of current Maryland 
law on these issues reflects a decidedly minority approach, and Maryland’s 
current law governing contributory negligence, without serious dispute, can 
accurately be categorized as aberrant. 
Sometimes, principled legislation can form the basis for legislative 
compromise.  Let’s hope that it happens here.  If not, the General Assembly 
will be at fault and responsible for all the resulting damages that will befall 
both future victims of accidents and Maryland businesses as well. 
